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ABSTRACT 
The series of terrorist attacks in France since the early 2000s, many committed by 
French-born Muslims, caused renewed concern about the integration of France’s large 
Muslim minority. While integration challenges are arguably not the root cause of 
radicalization among French Muslims, they are likely a contributing factor. This thesis 
considers the potential benefits and feasibility of adopting a multicultural policy 
framework as an alternative to the traditional French Republican model of integration in 
order to improve the integration of French Muslims and to potentially curb radicalization. 
Many French Muslims are concentrated in isolated suburban areas characterized by poor 
education opportunities, unemployment, and crime. French Muslims have also been 
disproportionately affected by France’s commitment to a strict laïque secularism that has 
made it exceedingly difficult for them to establish an improved religious infrastructure. 
Furthermore, French Muslims often suffer from exclusion, discrimination, and even hate 
crimes. This thesis contends that multicultural policies could have some positive effects 
on integration in the area of religious rights accommodation, but such policies are 
unlikely to significantly improve the overall integration of French Muslims because their 
primary concerns are social acceptance and obtaining full access to their individual rights 
as French citizens and not differential group rights. 
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France has been called a “multicultural society without multiculturalism” and 
criticized for employing what is considered by many to be a largely assimilationist model 
of integration.1 But would multiculturalism be a desirable option for France? Would it be 
an effective framework to address the concerns of France’s estranged Muslim population? 
Specifically, this thesis will examine how France has pursued the integration of Muslim 
minority populations into society and to what extent its official commitment to secularism 
has affected this process. What challenges and benefits does multiculturalism present 
within the current French system? Could multiculturalism help resolve France’s purported 
integration problems? Finally, could multiculturalist policies help reduce social tensions 
and curb radicalization and increasing homegrown terrorist attacks in France to contribute 
to a more stable, secure society?  
In order to investigate these questions and others, this thesis will take up the 
following issues: the unique challenges presented by France’s Republican state model and 
the attitude toward religion expressed in France’s official policy of secularist laïcité, 
implications of the French government’s immigration policies, socio-economic divisions 
established and reflected in housing arrangements affecting French Muslims, and the 
representation of Muslims in French media and society. Finally, an analysis of rights claims 
and grievances will suggest multiculturalism’s potential to improve the integration of 
Muslims in France and even prevent radicalization and homegrown terrorism. 
A. SIGNIFICANCE 
Immigration has reemerged one of the most divisive political issues of the 21st 
century, not only in France, but throughout Europe and beyond. The increase in 
globalization and the open borders of the European Union’s Schengen Zone have opened 
the door to increased economic immigration to Europe in pursuit of employment. In 
addition, political conflicts in Northern Africa and the Middle East have spurred what has 
 
1 Raymond Taras, ed., Challenging Multiculturalism: European Models of Diversity (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 15. 
2 
come to be known as the European migrant “crisis” as hundreds of thousands have fled 
their homelands in search of safety and better living conditions in Europe. The recent influx 
of immigrants, refugees, asylum seekers, and displaced persons has prompted many 
European countries to reassess their policies for integration. In light of the recent increase 
in terrorist acts by Muslim extremists, the large number of immigrants from Muslim 
societies has generated concern in many Western societies, leading them to question their 
ability and willingness to integrate growing Muslim minorities. 
France has a long history of immigration, much of which took place after becoming 
a nation-state in the late 18th century. Therefore, immigration and integration together have 
played an important role in its development as a nation and a society. France also 
maintained a vast colonial empire until the aftermath of the Second World War, which 
uprooted the preexisting international order and brought about its gradual decolonization. 
This was accompanied by a steady flow of immigrants into France, many of whom hailed 
from Northern and Western Africa and practiced Islam. As of 2016, Muslims made up 
4.9% of Europe’s population, with an estimated 5.72 million living in France.2 
Over the years, the French government has faced many challenges in addressing its 
growing Muslim population and the nation has experienced surges in terrorist acts 
perpetrated by Muslims, many of whom were born and raised in France.3 A predominant 
narrative is that Muslim integration into French society has failed under its traditional 
Republican structure and some advocate a different approach or model such as 
multiculturalism.  
In order to appreciate the current status of French Muslim minorities and associated 
immigration concerns, it is important to understand the local context and integration 
policies employed in France over time. The aim would be to determine with greater 
confidence whether France’s approach has in fact facilitated or hindered integration and to 
 
2 “Muslim Population Growth in Europe,” Pew Research Center, November 29, 2017, 
https://www.pewforum.org/2017/11/29/europes-growing-muslim-population/. 
3 Michael S. Neiberg, “‘No More Elsewhere’: France Faces the New Wave of Terrorism,” The 
Washington Quarterly 40, no. 1 (January 2, 2017): 24–25, https://doi.org/10.1080/
0163660X.2017.1302736. 
3 
what extent a multicultural model of integration could be more effective. As Favell 
explains “a feasible multi-ethnic diversity makes everyone better off. Failure to achieve the 
right framework for integration, however, will lead to an increase in intolerance and 
xenophobia among majority populations, and a loss of ‘moral social order.’”4 If it is 
accepted that failed integration is a likely factor leading to the radicalization of individual 
Muslims who potentially resort to terrorism in response, identifying an effective integration 
framework is of vital importance to modern states. These findings may enable France and 
other European countries to better tailor their policies to promote effective integration of 
their Muslim populations. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This thesis will benefit from a number of books that address France specifically, 
including the following: Challenging Multiculturalism; Multiculturalism, Muslims, and 
Citizenship; The Emancipation of Europe’s Muslims; Philosophies of Integration; and 
Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany.5 This literature review will, 
however, concentrate on the core concepts at issue in this investigation, namely 
multiculturalism and radicalization. The primary research question relates to a number of 
complex concepts with entire fields of literature dedicated to each in its own right. While 
it is impractical to provide exhaustive analysis of each relevant field, certain major themes 
and arguments are necessarily related to the overarching study. This review will first 
consider what multiculturalism means, how it relates and contributes to integration, and 
how it can be studied. It will then consider research findings concerning factors that 
contribute to radicalization, including under what conditions radicalization leads to acts of 
terrorism. An overview of the multiculturalism literature will provide a framework with 
 
4 Adrian Favell, Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and 
Britain, 2nd ed, Migration, Minorities, and Citizenship (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 4. 
5 Florent Villard and Pascal-Yan Sayegh, “Redefining a (Mono)Cultural Nation: Political Discourse 
against Multiculturalism in Contemporary France,” in Challenging Multiculturalism: European Models of 
Diversity, ed. Raymond Taras (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 236–54; Tariq Modood, 
Anna Triandafyllidou, and Ricard Zapata-Barrero, eds., Multiculturalism, Muslims, and Citizenship: A 
European Approach (New York: Routledge, 2006); Jonathan Laurence, The Emancipation of Europe’s 
Muslims: The State’s Role in Minority Integration (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012); Favell, 
Philosophies of Integration; Joel S. Fetzer and J. Christopher Soper, Muslims and the State in Britain, 
France, and Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
4 
which to analyze policies and approaches to integration within France and determine its 
potential to address shortcomings of France’s Republican model.  
1. Multiculturalism 
According to David Miller, multiculturalism is “an ideology that attaches positive 
value to cultural diversity, calls for the equal recognition of different cultural groups, and 
calls upon the state to support such groups in various ways.”6 The relevance of 
multiculturalism in today’s context, however, goes beyond simple rhetoric or attitudes in 
favor of a multicultural society. In practice, multicultural policies refer to “specific 
government policies designed to positively recognize diversity and help minorities 
maintain cultural and religious practices while integrating them into public life.”7 In other 
words, multicultural policies seek to integrate minorities into the local society without them 
having to sacrifice the customs and characteristics that make them unique. It is important 
to note that multicultural policies focus on the collective rights of particular groups as 
opposed to individual rights. While the term “multicultural” seems to have fallen out of 
fashion, with some political leaders moving away from using the term at all, many Western 
nations still uphold various multicultural policies.8 Some commentators misuse the term 
to describe different policies concerning citizenship and anti-discrimination which are 
more concerned with ensuring the application of universal rights to individuals than with 
upholding collective group-differentiated rights.9 Examples of multicultural policies can 
include separate schools or special curricula, affirmative action programs, mandatory 
representation in institutions, or exemption from various codes and obligations.10  
 
6 David Miller, “Multiculturalism and the Welfare State: Theoretical Reflections,” in Multiculturalism 
and the Welfare State: Recognition and Redistribution in Contemporary Democracies, ed. Keith Banting 
and Will Kymlicka (Oxford University Press, 2006), 326–27. 
7 Matthew Wright and Irene Bloemraad, “Is There a Trade-off between Multiculturalism and Socio-
Political Integration? Policy Regimes and Immigrant Incorporation in Comparative Perspective,” 
Perspectives on Politics 10, no. 1 (2012): 78, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592711004919. 
8 Ruud Koopmans, “Multiculturalism and Immigration: A Contested Field in Cross-National 
Comparison,” Annual Review of Sociology 39, no. 1 (2013): 152, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-
071312-145630. 
9 Koopmans, 151. 
10 Koopmans, 151–52. 
5 
With respect to the multiculturalism debate, European countries are often compared 
to what are considered to be the classical immigration countries, Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, and the United States, because of their high percentages of foreign-born 
populations.11 In conducting cross-national comparisons of multiculturalism, Koopmans 
emphasizes the importance of the degree and form of diversity within countries’ 
populations, as these factors can have important policy implications.12 To illustrate, he 
compares foreign born and Muslim population percentages in the four classical 
immigration countries and ten European immigration countries. For example, he shows 
that Australia had 23.9% and the United States had 12.9% of their populations that were 
foreign born in 2010, compared to 11.3% in Britain and 11.1% in France.13 However, the 
percentages of Muslims in Britain and France were 4.6% and 7.5% respectively, whereas 
in Australia they made up only 1.9%, and only 0.8% in the United States.14 His results 
reveal that European countries, while lower in overall numbers of immigrants, have 
significantly higher percentages of Muslims, both immigrant and native-born. 
Bevelander and Taras note that “both beneficiaries and critics agree that 
multiculturalism is a way to make claims on the state—justifiable ones for the first group, 
opportunistic ones for the second.”15 Multicultural policies can extend into multiple realms 
of society and include social, political, economic, cultural and religious rights. Koopmans 
and his co-authors found that in the 1990s, “60–80% of immigrant claims for cultural rights 
in France, Britain, and the Netherlands were made by non-Christian religious groups” and 
that a disproportionately vast majority of claims for religious rights were made by Muslims 
compared to other religious groups.16 This is significant because, as Koopmans explains, 
 
11 Koopmans, 147. 
12 Koopmans, 149. 
13 Koopmans, 150. 
14 Koopmans, 150. 
15 Raymond Taras and Pieter Bevelander, “The Twilight of Multiculturalism? Findings from across 
Europe,” in Challenging Multiculturalism: European Models of Diversity (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2013), 14. 
16 Ruud Koopmans et al., Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe, vol. 
25 (University of Minnesota Press, 2005), http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/j.ctttsd0w. 
6 
“religious rights claims tend to be more difficult to accommodate than ethnic claims 
because they are not just about customs but are often seen as sacred duties that cannot be 
compromised.”17 The proportionally high number of Muslims and their record for 
appealing to multiculturalism to obtain or uphold their rights helps to explain why the 
debate is fundamentally different in Europe, in contrast with the classical immigration 
countries.18 
Multiculturalism as a public policy is intended to help promote the integration of 
minorities, but some have questioned its effectiveness and legitimacy. Mackey argues that 
there is a degree of tolerance inherent to multiculturalism, which she describes as “an 
integral part of the project of building and maintaining dominant power, and reinforcing 
Western hegemony.”19 In her view, multiculturalism reinforces the difference between 
majority and minority and thus perpetuates a hierarchy. Similarly, Zizek asserts that “after 
righteously rejecting direct populist racism as ‘unreasonable’ and unacceptable for our 
democratic standards, they [governments] endorse ‘reasonably’ racist protective 
measures.”20 In his view, “today’s tolerant liberal multiculturalism is an experience of the 
Other deprived of its Otherness—the decaffeinated Other,” in which otherness is 
“quarantined” to become less threatening.21 In 2011, both David Cameron, then the British 
Prime Minister, and Nicolas Sarkozy, then the French President, expressed their 
discouragement concerning integration via multiculturalism, essentially calling it a 
failure.22 This has tarnished multiculturalism’s positive image as a desirable and effective 
tool for integration. Echoing these comments, a common sentiment in Europe today is that 
multiculturalism has failed to advance integration and that it has in fact promoted 
segregation and increased social tensions.  
 
17 Koopmans, “Multiculturalism and Immigration,” 150. 
18 Koopmans, 151. 
19 Eva Mackey, The House of Difference: Cultural Politics and National Identity in Canada (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2002), 163. 
20 Slavoj Zizek, “Barbarism With A Human Face,” In These Times 34, no. 12 (2010): 15, 
https://doi.org/ProQuest. 
21 Zizek, 15. 
22 Koopmans, “Multiculturalism and Immigration,” 148. 
7 
The liberal argument against multiculturalism stems from the understanding that 
the concept of the nation-state emerged in the seventeenth century as a means to transcend 
ethnic, cultural, and religious differences and supersede them with national unity, 
solidarity, and equality.23 With multiculturalism, the very institution that was intended to 
moderate differences is being used to encourage them. Joppke describes Barry’s and 
Sartori’s views that the cultural recognition prescribed by multiculturalism becomes 
problematic in that it is not possible to recognize all cultures equally because the 
comprehensive embracing of all cultures unavoidably devalues them.24 In other words, if 
every culture is special, none is special. As a result, some scholars have argued that there 
has been a general retreat from multiculturalism due to lack of public support, policy 
failures, and a “new assertiveness of the liberal state to impose liberal principles.”25 This 
retreat has been associated with a “return of assimilation” in response to the differentialist 
nature of multiculturalism.26 Concerning integration, Taras and Bevelander maintain, 
“citizenship, not multiculturalism, is becoming the barometer of successful state 
management of diversity as well as of immigrant integration attainment.”27  
Without completely denouncing multiculturalism, Bikhu Parekh contends that 
humanity is too complex to be adequately addressed by one policy or ideology.28 But other 
observers find that there is still value in multicultural policies, particularly when paired 
with measures for civic integration such as host-country language courses, instruction in 
national politics, history, and culture, and citizenship rites.29 In contrast to arguments that 
 
23 Christian Joppke, “The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy 1,” 
British Journal of Sociology 55, no. 2 (2004): 237–57, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-4446.2004.00017.x. 
24 Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2002), 270; Giovanni Sartori, Pluralismo, multiculturalismo e estranei: saggio 
sulla società multietnica (Milan: Biblioteca Universale Rizzoli, 2002), 69; cited in Joppke, 242. 
25 Joppke, 237. 
26 Rogers Brubaker, “The Return of Assimilation? Changing Perspectives on Immigration and Its 
Sequels in France, Germany, and the United States,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 24, no. 4 (2001): 531–48, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870120049770. 
27 Taras and Bevelander, “The Twilight of Multiculturalism? Findings from across Europe,” 11. 
28 Bhikhu C. Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory, 2. ed 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 338. 
29 Koopmans, “Multiculturalism and Immigration,” 156. 
8 
civic integration is replacing multicultural policies, some experts argue against a zero-sum 
relationship between the two.30 Mathieu argues that the adoption of civic integration 
policies can complement multicultural policies and be consistent with a “multiculturalist 
advance.”31 Wright and Bloemraad consider how “how multicultural and citizenship 
policies influence immigrants’ socio-political engagement with their adoptive nation” in 
areas of social inclusion, political inclusion, and political engagement.32 They conclude 
that multiculturalism “in no case hinders engagement with society and government, and in 
many cases seems to foster it.”33 In their view, the “repeal of such policies is likely to have 
the perverse effect of further marginalizing and alienating immigrant populations.”34 This 
judgement would support the argument that the negative light cast on multiculturalism 
could be merely a “crisis of perception.”35 According to Wright and Bloemraad, those who 
defend multiculturalism, including Kymlicka, Parekh, and Taylor, generally claim that by 
supporting and recognizing minorities, these communities will develop stronger 
connections to their states and societies.36 
While there is still much debate surrounding justifications for multiculturalism, an 
important challenge lies in measuring its outcomes. Koopmans reviews a number of studies 
that seek to evaluate the outcome of multicultural policies with respect to immigrant 
 
30 Wright and Bloemraad, “Is There a Trade-off between Multiculturalism and Socio-Political 
Integration?”; Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka, “Is There Really a Backlash Against Multiculturalism 
Policies” (working paper, Stockholm Center for Linnaeus for Integration Studies, October 4, 2012), 
http://su.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:821657/FULLTEXT01.pdf; Félix Mathieu, “The Failure of State 
Multiculturalism in the UK? An Analysis of the UK’s Multicultural Policy for 2000–2015,” Ethnicities 18, 
no. 1 (2018): 43–69, https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796817713040. 
31 Mathieu, “The Failure of State Multiculturalism in the UK?,” 43. 
32 Wright and Bloemraad, “Is There a Trade-off between Multiculturalism and Socio-Political 
Integration?,” 77. 
33 Wright and Bloemraad, 77. 
34 Wright and Bloemraad, 77. 
35 Steven Vertovec and Susanne Wessendorf, eds., Multiculturalism Backlash: European Discourses, 
Policies and Practices (London: Routledge, 2010), 21, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203867549. 
36 Wright and Bloemraad, “Is There a Trade-off between Multiculturalism and Socio-Political 
Integration?”; Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Oxford 
Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism; Charles Taylor, 
Multiculturalism and “The Politics of Recognition”: An Essay, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1992). 
9 
integration in several domains.37 He concludes that multicultural policies have had “little 
effect on socioeconomic integration, some positive impact on political integration, and 
negative effects on sociocultural integration,” but that policies concerning individual 
citizenship tended to explain more than multiculturalism.38 The most conclusive 
correlation found was that host-country language proficiency and usage tended to be lower 
and residential segregation higher in countries with stronger multicultural policies.39 He 
notes that segregation is one of multiculturalism’s biggest criticisms and that the lack of 
language acquisition hinders other policies intended to promote civic integration to either 
supplement or substitute for multiculturalism. 
Koopmans suggests that one of multiculturalism’s shortcomings is that religion has 
not been given enough consideration as an important and distinct factor in integration.40 
To this point, Joppke highlights Zolberg and Long’s observation that “language differs 
from religion in that one can…master more than one language, whereas the mark of 
religious affiliation is to be exclusive.”41 In other words, religion is a singular characteristic 
that is not as easily accommodated as language by multiculturalism, which by definition 
also implies state support. As Koopmans observes, multiculturalism does “not tell us where 
reasonable religious claims that merit accommodation end and where those that conflict 
too much with the values and institutional traditions of a particular society begin.”42 The 
interplay between multiculturalism and secularism has become problematic since, as noted 
previously, religion is its most controversial aspect in the European context. The challenge 
stems from a dynamic in which “religious claims must be accommodated within 
preexisting normative understandings and institutional arrangements of state-church 
relations that have crystallized in nationally specific ways from centuries of demarcation 
 
37 Koopmans, “Multiculturalism and Immigration,” 165. 
38 Koopmans, 147. 
39 Koopmans, 164. 
40 Koopmans, 151. 
41Aristide Zolberg and Long Litt Woon, “Why Islam is like Spanish: Cultural Incorporation in Europe 
and the United States,” Politics and Society 27, no. 1 (1999): 21; cited in Joppke, “The Retreat of 
Multiculturalism in the Liberal State,” 241. 
42 Koopmans, “Multiculturalism and Immigration,” 165. 
10 
struggles between states and Christian churches.”43 The way countries sought to resolve 
church-state relations concerning Christianity has often become the model for their 
interactions with Islam.  
2. Radicalization and Terrorism 
Another common narrative among European political leaders is that 
multiculturalism contributes to the radicalization of their Muslim populations, with some 
going a step further to relate it directly to homegrown terrorism.44 King and Taylor explain 
that there has been a major conceptual shift away from viewing terrorists as foreigners 
trained abroad to attack Western countries to focusing on “second- and third-generation 
immigrants, born in Western countries. who become radicalized.”45 If the object of 
multicultural polices is to support integration, a lack of integration may serve as a 
contributing factor to Muslim radicalization and terrorism, in at least some cases.  
The fact that there is not a commonly accepted definition of radicalization in the 
scholarly literature suggests its complexity and highly controversial nature.46 Most 
scholars tend to offer their own definition, which creates ambiguity concerning whether 
radicalization refers to an ideology, a type of behavior, or both.47 Bartlett and Miller offer 
a somewhat generic definition of the term as “the process by which individuals are 
introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages movement 
from moderate, mainstream beliefs towards extreme views.”48 This definition is 
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ideological and describes individuals who “reject the status quo.”49 Another definition 
describes radicalization as “the psychological transformations that occur among Western 
Muslims as they increasingly accept the legitimacy of terrorism in support of violent jihad 
against Western countries.”50 This definition is more representative of how the 
phenomenon is viewed in Europe.  
Most scholars tend to agree that no specific profile exists for violent extremists.51 
As a result, experts have developed numerous theories and models in an attempt to capture 
how individuals become radicalized. Bartlett and Miller group a number of theories into 
three categories.52 The first is based on the idea that, under certain circumstances, terrorism 
becomes a rational course of action to achieve a desired objective.53 The second group of 
theories involves processes with distinct phases along the path to violence.54 The third 
group relies on social movement theory, which asserts that “people are drawn into 
movements for reasons other than those directly related to the aims of the group itself” and 
instead become mobilized through socialization and network building.55 The authors 
conducted a comparison of Muslim terrorists, non-violent Muslim radicals, and 
mainstream Muslims to identify shared attributes and ideologies. They found that each 
group shared experiences of alienation from the state, anger towards Western foreign 
policy, discrimination, and identity conflicts.56 Moreover, individuals within each group 
had varying degrees of religious knowledge.57 From the differences, Bartlett and Miller 
identify several elements to explain “how radicalization that leads to violence sometimes 
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differs from radicalization that does not: emotional ‘pull’ to act in the face of injustice; 
thrill, excitement, and coolness; status and internal code of honour; and peer pressure.”58 
King and Taylor evaluated five prominent models for homegrown jihadi 
radicalization and identified three common psychological factors.59 The first factor 
consisted of experiences of subjective group-relative deprivation when the group’s material 
conditions were compared to that of other groups.60 In other words, they perceived their 
group’s disadvantage as an injustice. The second factor involved identity-related issues or 
personal crises stemming from discrimination, lack of integration, and managing dual-
identities—that is, balancing between their Western and their inherited ethnic and religious 
identities.61 Finally, individual personality characteristics complement the situational 
factors.62  
From a different perspective, Taylor and Horgan present a conceptual framework 
for a “psychology of terrorism” as a process that is driven by rational choice theory. They 
argue that “involvement in terrorism, at least in psychological terms, [is] a process rather 
than a state.”63 During this process the focus turns to an individual’s changing context 
rather than his or her psychological or moral qualities. They identify setting events or “past 
contextual influence,” personal factors, and the overall social, political, and organizational 
context as three factors relating to the influences affecting an individual’s choice to engage 
in terrorism.64 
While the previous models analyze factors and processes contributing to 
radicalization and leading to terrorism, Pisoiu takes a different stance by challenging the 
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assumption that there even is a meaningful connection between Islamist radicalization and 
terrorism in Europe.65 She argues against the deterministic approach of identifying causal 
factors and processes because they do not account for the countless individuals who 
experience the same things, but either (a) do not radicalize or (b) radicalize and do not 
resort to terrorism. She argues that “individual radicalization [is] an intentional process” 
and that “stopping terrorism might have in fact little to do with stopping radicalization.”66 
Pisoiu argues that the link between ideology and behavior remains unclear and King 
and Taylor similarly assert that “psychologists’ understanding of the radicalization process 
is very limited.”67 It may be true that too much importance is given to trying to establish a 
causal explanation for radicalization and terrorism, but Shore convincingly argues that “no 
one is born a terrorist; terrorists are bred…Though all are born neutral, they turn to terror 
in search of something larger than themselves.”68 While there remains much debate on the 
issue, many scholars accept that “radicalization is a transformation based on social-
psychological processes” but that there is not one universal route to terrorism.69 In this 
sense, each individual’s experience, each path to radicalization and terrorism, is unique. 
King and Taylor concluded that “the most plausible model for radicalization would be one 
that considers an interaction between personality traits and situational factors.”70 
C. SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY 
Since much of the literature and data pertaining to France are published in the 
French language, this study draws on many secondary sources. While this thesis is intended 
to address issues pertinent to France at the national level, some sections focus more heavily 
on urban areas and on the greater Paris metropolitan area specifically. However, this 
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concentration should not detract from the relevance of the thesis for several reasons. Not 
least, France itself is highly centralized around Paris as its center of social, economic, and 
political affairs. In addition, some 43% of all immigrants and 32% of their descendants live 
in the Ile-de-France region surrounding the city.71 Finally, some of France’s deadliest 
terrorist attacks committed by Muslim extremists took place in and in the vicinity of Paris.  
Article 6 of French law 78–17 of January 6, 1978 prohibits the government’s 
collection of certain elements of personal data including racial and ethnic origins and 
religion.72 Under certain conditions, some exceptions are made for public institutions such 
as the French Institute for Demographic Studies (INED) or the National Institute of 
Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) whose purpose is to identify trends through the 
collection of demographic information. Information concerning religion and ethnicity can 
still be gathered through polls and surveys, but naturally such surveys are limited to the 
sample represented. As a result, accurate figures and studies relating specifically to all 
French Muslims can be difficult to find.  
As emphasized by Favell, “immigration, and the citizenship question it invites, is a 
political issue that can…rapidly throw into doubt much broader assumptions about the 
bases of social and political integration in a nation.”73 Since immigration policy plays an 
important role in the French Muslim experience, this thesis considers changes in French 
immigration policy as it was influenced by various sociopolitical factors in France’s history 
and reflected or impacted integration policy. Koopmans employs two frameworks to assess 
multicultural policies, which are helpful in exploring the subject in question: the 
Multiculturalism Policy Index (MPI) and the Indicators of Citizenship Rights for 
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Immigrants (ICRI), which includes equal and differential rights.74 These indices assign an 
overall score but also identify important elements of multicultural policies and rights 
regimes to further evaluate within France. In addition to these models, an analysis of 
various societal and socioeconomic conditions will provide more nuance to the context for 
consideration of multiculturalism.  
This chapter discusses the significance of the research question and provides an 
explanation of relevant concepts as well as a literature review of major theories and 
arguments in order to establish an analytic framework. Chapter II presents the French 
Republican model of integration by highlighting several core concepts, values, and 
institutions that are intrinsic to France’s state structure, including citizenship, secular 
laïcité, and the role of the public education system. Chapter III introduces the Muslim 
population in France with an overview of their immigration history and considers several 
elements of integration including housing policies, education, employment, and challenges 
pertaining to religious practice and expression. With the political context established and a 
focused account of the Muslim experience in France provided, Chapter IV revisits 
multiculturalism as an integration policy and considers its suitability to address the 
grievances and rights claims put forth by French Muslims. This chapter also evaluates 
prospects for integration and for preventing the alienation and potential radicalization of 
homegrown terrorists. Chapter V concludes with a summary of research findings and 
recommendations for areas warranting further study.  
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II. THE FRENCH REPUBLICAN MODEL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In order to consider the status of multiculturalism in France, it is important to have 
an understanding of France’s Republican state model. France is arguably the birthplace of 
the modern nation-state, and French politics and certain cultural values are deeply rooted 
in a steadfast commitment to Republicanism. As Howarth and Varouxakis explain, France, 
more than other Western countries, has a “profoundly historicist political culture” that 
focuses on the past to provide the vocabulary and perspective used to frame modern 
challenges.75 Consequently, French public figures and politicians have a marked tendency 
to draw on historical themes and examples from France’s storied past to reinforce their 
rhetoric and to underscore contemporary arguments.  
The debate surrounding multiculturalism is no exception. It is sometimes 
“presented as the counter-example” to the French Republican model that emerged from the 
challenges of the French Revolution.76 This section first considers the origins of French 
Republicanism and explains the importance placed on certain values, including citizenship 
and secularism. It then discusses how matters of immigration and integration have been 
addressed within the French Republican framework. Finally, multiculturalism is located 
within the Republican model and considered as an alternative to assimilation and 
integration. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE 
The origin of Republicanism is one of the most important, yet complicated, 
elements of the French historical narrative. Many of France’s contemporary policies can 
be traced directly to its revolutionary origins and the struggle to establish a Republic. 
Emerging from the French Revolution, Republicanism has been challenged, shaped, and 
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informed over time by various reactions to it.77 It was not always widely accepted, 
however, and was associated with a number of atrocities and abuses of power throughout 
its early years. Beginning as the political ideology of one group, Republicanism has since 
progressed over the centuries to boast near universal acceptance as the rightful political 
structure of France. Embraced fully by both the right and the left, the French Republican 
model spans the entire political spectrum, thus making it very difficult to challenge.  
C. ORIGINS OF REPUBLICANISM 
During the French Revolution, a new state model emerged in France in response to 
the absolute monarchs that had ruled throughout the Middle Ages and until the late 
eighteenth century.78 Within this new model, “a nation of equal citizens [replaced] the king 
as the source of political power and legitimacy.”79 Inspired by compelling philosophies of 
the Enlightenment period, the basic tenets of this new model were outlined in the 1789 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen and approved by the newly formed National 
Assembly of France.80 The Declaration granted French citizens such basic rights as 
equality under the law, representative government, and freedom of speech and religion.81 
Initially, the monarchy remained in place with King Louis XVI as the head of state, but 
with his authority significantly limited by measures within France’s first Constitution of 
1791.82 This arrangement proved difficult to implement, however, so the First Republic 
was put in place in 1792, shortly before the execution of the king and his wife in 1793.83 
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The early French Republic did not have an easy start and the First Republic (1792-
1804) was very bloody. This stage was associated with unforgiving Jacobin leadership and 
a period called The Terror, during which those who failed to demonstrate support for the 
revolutionary cause were swiftly “eliminated.”84 This created a very negative image of the 
Republican idea throughout most of the nineteenth century; however, it is still widely 
regarded today as the major turning point for positive change within French national 
history.85  
The First Republic and later the Second (1848-1852) were each subverted, by 
Napoléon Bonaparte and Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte respectively, who quickly abolished 
the Republican institutions they had promised to serve and represent, making themselves 
emperors of France.86 The Third Republic (1870-1940) dissolved following Germany’s 
successful invasion and occupation of France during World War II and the establishment 
of the Vichy government, under which the French Republic was deliberately renamed 
“l’État Français” or the French State. Following these traumatic experiences, the Third and 
Fourth Republics sought to limit executive power with parliamentary regimes.87 As a 
result, the Algerian crisis overwhelmed the weak Fourth Republic (1946-1958), and this 
resulted in General Charles de Gaulle being called out of retirement to reunite the nation 
and write a new constitution for France’s Fifth Republic (1958-present).88 
It was not until about ten years into the Third Republic that Republicanism was able 
to “consolidate” support and achieve relative stability in France after nearly a century of 
struggle and dispute between supporters and opponents.89 From the 1870s onward, several 
groups who formerly opposed the Republic began to rally to its cause. These “ralliés” 
included monarchists, members of the conservative bourgeoisie, and Catholic 
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conservatives.90 Over time, these groups came to find elements of Republicanism more 
palatable than in the past for various reasons and determined that it would be more 
beneficial to embrace the Republic than to continue resisting it. By the end of the nineteenth 
century, most of the population considered themselves Republican. 
Since France’s official name is la République Française, anything relating to the 
state is “republican” by definition and all French people are essentially “republicans.”91 
Republicanism has taken on a deeper significance over time, however, and it has become 
more complex and politicized. French public figures often redundantly emphasize the word 
when discussing policies or legislation because “calling them ‘republican’ is assumed to 
give them the power attached to the idea of citizenship,” another concept born out of the 
Republic’s revolutionary heritage.92 Thus, although Republicanism rather painfully 
succeeded in achieving universal acceptance in France, there remains a wide spectrum of 
interpretations of its true meaning; and debates surrounding whether various policies are 
consistent with “Republican principles” are common within French politics.93 This 
tendency can be observed within the debate surrounding multiculturalism in France. 
D. FRENCH REPUBLICANISM TODAY 
At a minimum, “republican” implies that a state is not a monarchy, nor a 
dictatorship, and that democratic power is held by the citizens.94 In Britain and the United 
States, this has gone more or less hand in hand with embracing basic liberal values, 
including fundamental human rights, separation of powers, checks and balances, and 
respect for individual freedoms.95 In these contexts, diversity in ethnic and cultural 
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heritage is generally understood as an inherently positive feature that contributes to the 
richness of the overall body.96 
In France, however, the Republic has evolved in a manner that many describe as 
giving it a distinctly “illiberal” political culture.97 France’s particular take on liberalism is 
in many ways a product of the pre-revolutionary monarchical structure in which the kings 
of France had created a highly centralized state with a society composed of disconnected 
individuals.98 After the revolution, the French people wanted the nation’s sovereignty to 
remain undivided, and believed that this could be achieved as long as democratic power 
rested in the hands of individuals who were the true representatives of the people.99  
For this reason, the French Republic does not recognize groups among its citizens. 
It instead “relates to each citizen as an individual” only, and not as a representative of a 
group identity.100 
Unlike the liberal state, it [the Republic] is amenable to one collective 
project—it is itself a collective project which is not reducible to the 
protection of the rights of individuals or to the maximization of the choices 
open to individuals. The Republic seeks to enhance the lives of its members 
by making them part of a way of living that individuals could not create for 
themselves: its aim is to make the individuals members of a civic 
community.101 
In other words, while the French state concerns itself exclusively with the individual 
citizen, it does not aim to maximize individual liberties as an end in itself, but instead seeks 
to enhance the individual’s experience as being part of the greater national group. In 
Jennings’ words, “for the French citizen, belonging is political but it also contains a 
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vocation towards universalism” that focuses on the common good.102 The Republican 
tradition stresses civil equality and places great importance on what it means to be a French 
citizen.103 The Jacobin regime espoused a view of the nation in which belonging was both 
“civic and contractual, representing universal values and progress.”104 In this sense, being 
a citizen of the French nation implies having not only rights but also responsibilities. 
This distinctive political universalism is accompanied by a preoccupation with 
egalitarianism, as generations of feudal legacy left a great distaste for hierarchy and 
political privilege in France.105 The revolution, and ultimately the Republic, embraced an 
“individualistic and homogenous vision of the nation, which is conceived as an egalitarian 
‘community of citizens.’”106 Within this construct, “intermediary bodies” or sub-groups 
defined by particular attributes are unequivocally rejected.107 Furthermore, the notion of 
groups smaller than the nation having a unique set of rights is seen as completely contrary 
to the Republican institution because it would undermine common law. 108 This places 
multiculturalism squarely in opposition to the fundamental Republican principle of égalité, 
in which citizens are “equal in rights and in treatment.” 109 
1. Laïcité 
An important Republican particularism is manifested in France’s distinct approach 
to secularism or laïcité. While secularism is generally understood as the separation of 
church and state, it takes an uncommon form in France, where religious practice and 
religious expression are restricted entirely to the private domain. As is the case with many 
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Republican principles, secularism emerged from Enlightenment ideals and the French 
Revolution. It was intended to curb the power of the monarchy along with the widespread 
influence of the Catholic Church, which was the state religion at the time.  
Before the revolution, the church and the monarchy enjoyed a mutually beneficial 
relationship. Royalty promoted the church’s influence because it reinforced the belief that 
the king was divinely ordained in his position. With the support of the monarchy, the 
Catholic Church accumulated extensive property and exercised significant influence that 
permeated much of French society. This dynamic frustrated many French people who 
wanted to be free of not only the king’s rule, but of what they perceived as the Church’s 
outsized influence in everyday life. As a result, freedom of religion was legitimized as an 
individual right during the Revolution in Article 10 of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights 
of Man and Citizen, which states that “no one may be disturbed on account of his opinions, 
even religious ones, as long as the manifestation of such opinions does not interfere with 
the established Law and Order.”110 Furthermore, Catholicism lost its position as the state 
religion and the new government seized control of all church property. In 1790, the new 
Assembly passed legislation called the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, requiring French 
priests to be governed by local leadership instead of the Pope.111 Widespread refusal to 
swear an oath recognizing the law resulted in the brutal massacre of hundreds of clergy 
throughout France.112 
Not long after, Napoleon Bonaparte sought to make amends with the Catholic 
Church. He recognized that the vast majority of French people were, in fact, Catholic; and 
he appreciated the church’s potential to foster social control through morality.113 For this 
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reason, he advocated for the reestablishment of the Catholic Church in France, but under 
the specific conditions outlined in the Concordat of 1801. The document, signed by 
Napoleon and Pope Pius VII, ensured the Church’s protection by the new French 
government but also strictly regulated it. For example, bishops could continue to be 
ordained by the Pope but had to be nominated by and paid by the government.114 Thus, 
the Church was allowed to survive but under significant control of the French state. For 
individual Catholics, Article I of the Concordat upheld the right of freedom to worship so 
long as it did not disrupt public order.115 Furthermore, the Catholic Church, the Lutheran 
Church, and other Reformed Churches, and Judaism received official recognition and state 
support throughout the next century.116 
In December 1905, however, legislation concernant la séparation des Églises et de 
l’ État was passed to officially separate the church and state in France.117 This law 
prohibited the French Republic from recognizing or providing financial support to any 
particular religion or religious institution, to include schools. Additionally, processions and 
any other public religious manifestation henceforth required approval from the mayor.118 
Today, laïcité remains enshrined in France’s current constitution of the Fifth Republic, 
adopted in 1958.119  
Laïcité in France is distinct in its modern approach to secularism because of what 
it was originally designed to address. Many French people opposed the moral authority 
claimed by the monarchy and enabled by the church because they perceived it as an abuse 
of power by both entities. As such, French secularism arose as the “political solution” to 
the state’s and society’s antagonistic relationship with the Catholic Church during the 
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French Revolution.120 Because of this, laïcité has come to embody more of a freedom from 
religion than simply the freedom of religion in the French Republic.121 As Decherf 
explains, “religious freedom is regarded in France as a human right, but never in isolation 
from other universal human rights.”122 As a result, there is not a strong foundation or 
framework to make religious claims on the French state. 
Over time, Republicanism and laïcité have become nearly synonymous.123 But 
France’s strict adherence to religious secularism is just one element of a deeper 
commitment to the “separation between the private and the public spheres” across all 
aspects of society.124 The French Republic does not embrace or even recognize differences 
among its citizens, and instead maintains that the “citizens who make up the nation have, 
in theory, neither ‘race,’ religion, ethnicity, class, nor culture.”125 Villard and Sayegh label 
this French perspective as a “politics of indifference.”126 In this sense, the French Republic 
views the nation as ideally being composed of undifferentiated, individual, civic beings.127  
2. Secular Education 
One of the most fundamental illustrations of the principle of laïcité can be found in 
the French school system. The public school has become a symbol of Republican ideals by 
enforcing and instilling laïcité as a strong value of French society. According to Carle, “the 
secular state and the institutional structure of public, secular education” constitute one of 
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the most important legacies of the Revolution.128 Nevertheless, the application of laïcité 
in education has continued to evolve over time.  
The Second French Empire ended in disaster in 1870–1871 with the particular 
embarrassment of military defeat and Germany’s annexation of Alsace Lorraine.129 To 
prevent similar episodes in the future, France’s new leadership identified a need to promote 
patriotism and to educate generations of individuals who would be willing to pay the 
ultimate sacrifice to defend their homeland.130 To achieve this, they adopted a heavily 
nationalistic curriculum emphasizing citizenship as a core value. As Béland describes, 
public schools become an essential tool for transforming youth from diverse backgrounds 
into “loyal French citizens” by promoting equal opportunity, collective identity, and 
common values and language in order to facilitate social and political integration.131 Along 
with military conscription, this nationalistic education became instrumental in “turning 
peasants into Frenchmen,” in Eugen Weber’s words.132 
From this point on, the overall focus of education shifted from “‘moral and religious 
instruction’ to that of ‘moral and civic instruction,’” emphasizing the qualities necessary 
to become strong and loyal citizens of the Republic.133 Simultaneously, the French 
education system was secularized in 1881–1882 with the Jules Ferry Laws. These laws 
ensured free public education; made school attendance mandatory for children under 
fifteen; removed religious clergy as educators; and removed all religious education from 
the curriculum.134 One day a week was to be set aside for religious practice and education 
outside of school. To this end, anything suggesting “religious affiliation or identity politics 
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is excluded” from the public school curriculum.135 Instead, French education centers on 
“universally apprehensible ideas and movements.”136 As Jennings observes, laïcité 
“postulates the existence of a secular ethic, grounded in science and philosophy, that would 
act not only as a civil religion and social bond but also as the means of educating the free 
and tolerant citizens.”137 
Consequently, public schools have a special relationship to laïcité and are 
considered to be neutral territory in France. To this end, another piece of legislation was 
passed in 2004 prohibiting “the wearing of signs or clothing manifesting a religious 
affiliation in public schools.”138 This would come to include items such as Christian 
crosses, Jewish yarmulkes, and Muslim headscarves or hijabs, which will be discussed later 
in greater detail. As Carle explains, “unlike the American model, the French public school 
is governed not by a principle of equal accommodation of the private within the public life 
of the school, but through a principle of equal exclusion of the private from the public.”139 
As schools are public institutions, students are correspondingly treated as “public beings” 
while on their grounds.140 Since religion is considered to be a private affair, students are 
universally barred from religious expression at French public schools. Carle further 
explains that “by redefining people in terms of their public selves, the French model shifts 
the focus of democratic education from teaching toleration of private others to instilling 
mutual respect for public equals. In this system, civic virtue does not require toleration of 
difference, because people’s differences do not enter the public square.”141 In short, a 
multicultural model which promotes and supports cultural differences has no place in 
secular French schools. 
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3. Nationalism 
Over time, Republicanism has also become associated with a strong sense of 
nationalism. In the Republic’s early stages, however, national unity was not inherent and 
therefore had to be constructed. During this process, local and regional cultures were 
considered “backward and reactionary,” and therefore “their destiny had to be subsumed 
into the universal and modern Republican nation.”142 To achieve this, the nascent 
government actively pursued the eradication of many forms of differences, including 
cultural distinctions and regional dialects, which ultimately contributed to monolingualism 
becoming a norm of modern European nation-states.143 This approach resulted in a long-
standing, general dislike for minorities within the French Republic, as they were, and often 
still are, perceived as a threat to national unity. 
Like Republicanism itself, the meaning of nationalism in the French context can 
have multiple interpretations and has taken different forms. One understanding of 
nationalism is associated with the early aspiration to create a nation-state, as was the case 
for many people under the rule of vast multi-ethnic empires that dominated most of Europe 
until the First World War. 144 Another understanding suggests the primacy of the sovereign 
state and the subordination of all other interests to it.145 Drawing a parallel to Michel 
Wincock’s distinction between open and closed French nationalism, Howarth and 
Varouxakis assert that France has been influenced by both types.146  
Traditional Republican nationalism, often embraced by the Left, grew out of the 
French Revolution and was characterized by the “desire to expel foreign armies” and affirm 
the liberty and equality of newly sovereign people who were citizens by choice.147 During 
this time, the Republic developed “universalist pretensions” holding that its model was 
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superior to that of other nations and that France, in fact, had a moral obligation to spread 
democracy, revolution, progress, and civilization to the rest of the world.148 This sense of 
moral superiority gave way to a “missionary conception” of French nationalism throughout 
the nineteenth century, whereby French patriots justified conquering other peoples in order 
to “liberate” them.149 The French mission civilisatrice or “civilizing mission” is 
representative of open nationalism, which was intended to be altruistic and benevolent, 
albeit elitist and sometimes militaristic.150 On the other hand, more conservative, early 
right-wing forms of French nationalism focused on internal order and the need for 
powerful, centralized leadership.151 This attitude aligns with closed nationalism, which is 
often inward-looking, exclusive, and defensive. Closed nationalism has arisen in France 
during times of crisis and has sought to “eliminate intruders” such as Jews, immigrants, or 
revolutionaries.152 
France’s nationalist tendencies have fluctuated and often have corresponded to 
overarching political trends. Much of the twentieth century was characterized by open 
nationalism as President Charles de Gaulle oversaw France’s decolonization process after 
the Second World War and the Algerian Crisis, and sought to make France a champion of 
other national liberation movements.153 However, the 1980s brought about a resurgence 
of closed nationalism as oil crises in the 1970s caused economic hardship.154 In addition, 
German reunification, increased European integration, and a general distrust and dislike of 
growing U.S. dominance caused further unease.155 In this context, the Front National (FN) 
emerged as a strong political force opposing globalization and outside influence.156 While 
 
148 Howarth and Varouxakis, 105. 
149 Howarth and Varouxakis, 105. 
150 Howarth and Varouxakis, 112. 
151 Howarth and Varouxakis, 108. 
152 Howarth and Varouxakis, 113. 
153 Howarth and Varouxakis, 112–14. 
154 Howarth and Varouxakis, 114. 
155 Howarth and Varouxakis, 114. 
156 Howarth and Varouxakis, 114. 
30 
France has experienced periods of open and closed nationalism throughout its history as a 
Republic, elements of both types are perennially at play and influence the ways in which 
the French view outsiders and minorities. 
4. Immigration 
In this context, immigration has played a unique and varying role throughout 
France’s turbulent journey as a nation-state. Its immigration policies and views on 
citizenship have often been a reflection of the contemporary political climate and ongoing 
challenges. At times, immigrants were welcomed as a means to strengthen the Republic, 
while at other times they were met with great resistance. Nevertheless, “France has the 
longest history of immigration in Europe and was the only country to have experienced 
significant inward migration prior to the Second World War.”157 As indicated in the 
previous sections, the French Republic places great value on citizenship and national unity. 
As a result, the Republican model has created a unique environment for both immigrants 
and minorities in France, affecting their integration into society.  
During the Revolution, the emerging French nation largely embraced a policy of 
droit du sol, also known as birthright citizenship, and welcomed willing foreigners in order 
to gain support for the revolutionary cause.158 Droit du sol was renewed later in the 
nineteenth century mainly to force the children of immigrants, who were mostly Belgian 
and Italian at the time, to assume military obligations during France’s conflicts and 
conquests.159 During the Third Republic, it was formally stipulated that children of 
immigrant parents born in France would be granted French citizenship as soon as they came 
of age.160 Additionally, the grandchildren of immigrants were to be automatically granted 
French nationality at birth.161 It is important to note that French citizenship under these 
conditions was not necessarily voluntary.  
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After the First World War, demographic considerations were a primary concern in 
France. The population had thinned so significantly due to the heavy loss of life that 
citizenship requirements were considerably reduced.162 Beginning in 1927, foreigners 
were only required to reside in France for three years before becoming eligible for 
naturalization.163 In this way, the Republic sought to replace Frenchmen with naturalized 
immigrants, primarily from Italy, Poland, and Spain.164 France again adopted a relatively 
liberal policy framework following the Second World War and was the only country in 
Europe to encourage permanent immigration during this period.165 To support rebuilding 
the economy, France passed legislation in 1945 that encouraged the immigration of foreign 
workers along with their families.166 
Despite these relatively progressive policies, the official immigration regime was 
still preferential towards certain groups and encouraged recruitment from European 
countries over North Africa or Turkey.167 France did, however, consider ethnically 
oriented policies both before and after World War II based on a perceived level of 
“assimilability” of different groups as the criterion for granting residency permits.168 
Although these policies were rejected on both occasions, the tide began to turn in 1974 
when France experienced a severe economic downturn resulting in high levels of 
unemployment. In an attempt to curb joblessness, President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing tried 
to implement a policy to repatriate legal African immigrants by refusing to renew their 
residency permits.169 This proposal was also rejected by the Conseil d’État (Council of 
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State) due to its incompatibility with Republican values.170 However, a negative sentiment 
towards certain immigrants was becoming clearer. 
Throughout the 1980s, resentment toward immigrants continued to grow as 
unemployment steadily rose in France at the same time that immigrant communities 
became more concentrated and visible.171 As a result, immigration and integration became 
two of the most prominent issues in French politics from the mid-1980s to the 1993 
elections, particularly with the emergence of the Front National political party.172  
E. FRENCH REPUBLICAN INTEGRATION 
France’s liberal attitudes toward immigration ended with the 1970s oil crises.173 
Since 1973, its immigration policies have instead sought primarily to prevent migration.174 
This period of reduced immigration shifted the government’s focus toward addressing the 
large presence of immigrants already legally in France. With their increasing presence and 
visibility, the incorporation of immigrant populations into French society became a salient 
and unavoidable issue.175 Not surprisingly, French policymakers fell back on traditional 
Republican perspectives and values to guide and structure their efforts to address this 
challenge.  
France’s approach has often been characterized as assimilationist in nature, 
implying that minority cultures must “blend into the majority” and give up their own 
customs.176 This approach stemmed from the French Republic’s mission to unite people 
around a common identity during the years after the wars of the French Revolution and 
Napoleon. Later, assimilation was also associated with France’s exigent policies to prevent 
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sedition and emancipatory movements within its colonies during the Third Republic.177 
As Howarth and Varouxakis note, assimilation implied “the idea of a unilateral adaptation 
of immigrants to the laws and customs of France and of the French and the need for the 
elimination of the immigrants’ own identity and culture.”178 The term “assimilation” fell 
out of fashion between 1974 and 1984 as it was considered elitist and implied French 
superiority.179 Since then, France has moved toward a concept of integration, which 
suggests “a more subtle, interactive and subjective process for the immigrant in his or her 
identification with the values and norms of society,” and which does not necessarily require 
the complete acculturation of individuals.180  
The emergence of integration as a policy can initially be traced back to Charles de 
Gaulle’s experience with sub-Saharan Africa in 1944, when he attempted to redefine 
France’s difficult relationship with its colonies.181 In this context, integration was presented 
as a “‘realistic’ compromise between assimilation and secession” and was intended to ease 
local tensions.182 Integration’s next period of relevance was the Algerian crisis (1954-
1962). During this period, the Governor General, Jacques Soustelle, openly rejected the 
old politics of assimilation as both improbable and undesirable and instead advocated 
integration as a preferable model to afford Muslims more equality and cultural respect.183 
As a result, integration soon became a central topic of public policy debate in France.184 
 
177 Geisser, 498. 
178 Howarth and Varouxakis, “Citizenship, Nationalism and National Identity,” 122. 
179 Howarth and Varouxakis, 122. 
180 Villard and Sayegh, “Redefining a (Mono)Cultural Nation: Political Discourse against 
Multiculturalism in Contemporary France,” 242. 
181 Vincent Geisser, “Republican Integration: Reflections on a Postcolonial Issue (1961-2006),” in 
Colonial Culture in France Since the Revolution, ed. Pascal Blanchard et al., trans. Alexis Pernsteiner 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014), 499, http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt16gh82z. 
182 Geisser, 499. 
183 Geisser, 500. 
184 Geisser, 500. 
34 
Vincent Geisser asserts that integration has become a “rhetoric of crisis” in France, 
called upon in response to various challenges in its recent history.185 As discussed, 
integration was first proposed as a solution to address dissatisfied colonial populations 
outside France. In the mid-1980s, however, integration rhetoric was refocused 
domestically to “renationalize French identity” in order to address disconnected, 
postcolonial immigrants and their descendants, who were considered to be the Republic’s 
new “dangerous class.”186 As a result, the new rhetoric of integration played to prior 
colonial anxieties surrounding the rise of Muslim communitarianism; “Balkanization” of 
the social body; and sedition, by drawing parallels to new challenges regarding 
immigration, security in urban suburbs, and fears of Islamization.187 In short, the 
resurgence and reshaping of integration in the modern context were heavily influenced by 
colonial challenges, which contributed to shaping its development as a policy. 
Even still, the concept of integration remained rather ambiguous and undefined 
until the mid-1980s.188 Since the absence of a clear and robust policy left integration 
vulnerable to political manipulation by various groups and agendas, it was finally 
determined in the late 1980s that “a thorough reflection on the nature of French political 
unity under the new social, cultural, and demographic conditions” was needed to inform 
integration policy developments.189 This process was largely carried out by two main 
bodies.  
La Commission de la Nationalité (1987-88) was a committee made up primarily of 
Parisian intellectuals and academic elites in the fields of history, law, and political science, 
whose purpose was to clarify the law and devise proposals for reform.190 The commission 
conducted a publicly broadcasted, democratic forum during which nearly one hundred 
prominent leaders within the public sphere were interviewed about immigration and 
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integration issues and the meaning of being French.191 Ultimately, their findings were 
consolidated into a lengthy report, “être français aujourd’hui et demain” that included 
recommendations for reform and laid the foundations for French integration policy.192 As 
Jennings explains, the objective of integration, as described in the report, was that of 
“bringing ‘naturalized’ citizens and their children into the national community as full 
members, ‘even if in private they preserved their religious and cultural loyalties.’”193 The 
Commission’s 1988 report identified the following challenges as explanations for why 
integration was becoming more difficult: 
the links between mainland France and its former colonies [were] less 
strong; the influence of France in the world [was] less assured; high levels 
of unemployment [touched] the unskilled and therefore the immigrant 
[population] disproportionately; segregation in housing [made] establishing 
‘neighbouring relations with the French population’ less easy; the 
traditional institutions of integration – by which is meant not only the 
schools and the army but also the trade unions and the Church – [were] less 
efficient;” and that “the foreign population of France [had] changed.194 
Several years later, the French government established the Haut Conseil à 
l’intégration (1990-93) to build upon the framework laid out in the first report and to advise 
specifically on how to best integrate immigrants into society.195 Made up of politicians, 
local mayors, civil servants, judges, and an academic advisor, the council initiated a 
research program to “build knowledge and data about the actual progress of integration, 
and to confront a series of concrete institutional dilemmas with normative propositions for 
legal and political reform.”196 It produced six reports, which Favell describes as 
demonstrating “an extraordinary consensus in French public affairs, on the vocabulary, 
themes, and theoretical frame they provided.”197 
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Together, these two commissions developed a “self-coherent public philosophy of 
integration” to explain how immigration and integration policies should function.198 This 
theoretical framework and terminology still dominate the French debate on integration 
today. To summarize the French republican philosophy of integration, Jennings identifies 
four essential policy principles:  
(1) the integration of immigrants must be in accord with the secularism of 
the state: the latter respects religions, philosophies and beliefs but gives 
them no special support; (2) it is individuals rather than groups that integrate 
and at no time can or ought the action of integration contribute towards the 
constitution of structured communities; (3) integration presupposes rights 
and duties: an immigrant must respect French law as it is: in return, the law 
naturally respects their culture and traditions; (4) immigrants and the French 
must be treated equally, without developing the sentiment that immigrants 
are better treated than French people who are their neighbours.199 
Each of these pillars is rooted in traditional Republican values of “secularism 
and universalistic civic identity, as well as a strict separation between the private and the 
public spheres.”200 With this foundation, the objective of France’s integration model is to 
transform immigrants into “full French citoyens.”201 
The Republican integration model enjoyed popular support throughout most of the 
twentieth century. Since the 1980s, however, its effectiveness has been challenged by 
various social and political trends, namely difficulties in integrating diverse groups in 
French suburbs.202 These groups have typically struggled with long term unemployment 
leading to their social and political exclusion and their inability to fully participate in 
Republican life.203 This concern over social fragmentation has raised the question whether 
a more multicultural approach might be a better model to address France’s prevailing 
integration issues.  
 
198 Favell, 43. 
199 Jennings, “Citizenship, Republicanism and Multiculturalism in Contemporary France,” 583. 
200 Béland, “Identity Politics and French Republicanism,” 66. 
201 Favell, Philosophies of Integration, 4. 
202 Béland, “Identity Politics and French Republicanism,” 67. 
203 Béland, 67. 
37 
F. FRENCH REPUBLICAN VIEW OF MULTICULTURALISM 
Article 1 of the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic reads, “France is a 
Republic, indivisible, secular, democratic and social.”204 Due to the French nation’s deep-
seated commitment to these Republican values, multiculturalism has been met with great 
resistance in France, particularly among the political elite.205 Multiculturalism may be 
defined as “the theory and practice of recognizing the existence of different cultural, 
religious or ethnic groups within a country and granting them specific group rights 
designed to accommodate their specific needs and sensitivities.”206 As such, the concept 
of multiculturalism conflicts with both the indivisible and the secular nature of the 
Republic, and it is often seen as a threat to national unity. 
According to Béland, “social and political fragmentation has been a major source 
of concern in France since the 1980s.”207 While France’s integrationist approach has not 
resolved this persistent issue, multiculturalism is perceived as a greater threat that could 
lead to communitarianism and “cultural ghettos.”208 Jennings explains that rhetoric in the 
1995 annual report of the Haut Conseil à l’intégration accepts the notion of “community” 
only in the form of “‘a common sense of belonging…without judicial or institutional 
consequences’ but by no means in the form of ‘an organised and institutionalised grouping 
of part of the population according to ethnic or religious criteria, recognised by the public 
authorities.’”209 In other words, the state cannot formally recognize any ethnic or religious 
sub-groups, let alone provide them any targeted support. 
As a result, France’s Republican integration policy is not designed to favor 
immigrants or minorities over other French citizens, as a multicultural approach would 
prescribe. In short, multiculturalism is fundamentally in conflict with traditional 
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Republican values. First, the concept of multiculturalism threatens the indivisibility of 
French society, whose unity is “not negotiable at any level.”210 Cemented during its early 
years, the Republican model does not recognize groups or “intermediary bodies” between 
individuals and the state.211 According to the 1997 report of the Haut Conseil à 
l’intégration, “it is to each man and each woman that it has granted full rights in order to 
allow him or her individually to take a place in French society.’”212 In this context, a 
minority group has no political status.  
Second, favoring particular groups would violate the Republic’s focus on the 
universal, equal treatment of all citizens. Multiculturalism focuses on group rights vice 
individual rights, but within France’s Republican model, even individual rights are 
subordinated to universal collective rights. Within this framework, there is no platform to 
articulate cultural, ethnic, or religious group rights. According to a French intellectual, 
Pierre Rosanvallon, in France “it is the capacity of the generality to absorb all particulars 
which is the true condition of liberty.”213 As such, the Republic was structured so that no 
groups could claim collective rights or privileges of any kind.214 In keeping with this spirit, 
France’s integration policy prioritizes collective cohesion and what is best for the common 
good of French society over a multicultural concern for the autonomy or status of any sub-
groups.  
Finally, multiculturalism’s purpose–to single out groups based on particular 
characteristics–is incompatible with the French Republic’s secular view of its own society. 
In view of the French nation’s strict separation of public and private life, Rosanvallon 
describes France as having a “monist vision of the social and the political.”215 In this 
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context, French society is envisioned as a single unit in which “expressions of specific 
ethnic or religious identities in the public sphere are not perceived as legitimate.”216 
An added challenge to the acceptance of multiculturalism in France is the fact that 
religiously defined groups are often those seeking to make claims for special rights and 
recognition.217 Again, France’s resistance to group rights is directly tied to its experience 
in establishing boundaries with the Catholic Church. As Howarth and Varouxakis explain, 
“after having fought many battles against giving any special rights…to the Catholic 
Church, French republicans find it difficult to accept that the republic could cede special 
rights to a religious community…without fatally impairing its very nature.”218 As a result, 
the religious consideration of multiculturalism makes it that much more unpalatable in the 
French context, where a strong precedent has already been set.  
France’s strong sentiments against multiculturalism are a reflection of its attitude 
toward cultural diversity in general. Table 1 compares the Republican state’s response to 
cultural diversity to other state models.219 As expected, promotion of equal opportunity 
and recognition of difference are low and emphasis on national identity is high. This is 
indicative of France’s insistence on the “indivisible character of the public realm” and 
general “reluctance to accept diversity in the public domain.”220 This perspective can be 
observed with regard to other forms of intra-national diversity such as the discouragement 
of regional language dialects. As described by Feldblum, in this sense, “the ethnic citizen 
does not, and ought not, exist.”221 This creates an environment in which certain groups are 
“marginalized if their specific differences are externalized.”222 
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Table 1. The state and citizens’ responses to cultural diversity: Five ideal 
types.223 
 
G. THE INTEGRATION DEBATE 
The French Republican model was based on the ambition and assumption that its 
people would be essentially homogenous and their interests “undifferentiated.”224 While 
this assumption will be discussed in greater detail in the subsequent chapters, this is 
certainly no longer the reality in modern France, whose society continues to become 
increasingly more diverse. In terms of cultural and ethnic diversity, more than one in six 
people in France were either immigrants themselves or had at least one immigrant parent 
or grandparent as of 2001.225 Even still, as Jennings describes the nation, France is “a 
society of immigrants which nonetheless is not and does not see itself as a pluralist society,” 
or even multicultural.226 In general, the French tend to avoid using the term “multicultural” 
in political discourse, even in the purely descriptive sense, and prefer to use the phrase 
“cultural diversity” instead.227 But according to Béland, while there is still general 
opposition to multiculturalism in France, “the fact that it has entered the French vocabulary 
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is a sign of the increasing interrogation of the Republican model itself, which is at odds 
with the political celebration of cultural diversity at the center of multiculturalism.”228 
While the Republican integration model asserts the ability to absorb and unify all 
individuals as French citizens, this end state has not been realized for all groups. Despite 
Republicanism’s aversion to groups and communitarianism, some argue that the model 
itself contributes to the formation of sub-groups by its very nature. These sub-groups are 
effectively out-groups that are not readily embraced by society. As Geisser explains, “the 
paradox of the new integrationist rhetoric of the 1980s and 1990s was the same as the one 
at the heart of the notion of colonial integration and the project of assimilation: by 
establishing a clear distinction between ‘Them’ and ‘Us,’ and by pointing to ‘potentially 
seditious communities,’ it legitimized the existence of distinctive identities.”229 In other 
words, the Republican model not only recognizes but contributes to the formation of sub-
groups by identifying those that need to integrate. Geisser adds, “the ‘new’ doctrine of 
Republican integration, through its reactivation of a Republican aporia characteristic of 
the Third Republic’s assimilationist discourse—thinking [of] the Other as ‘inferior’ in 
order to justify the implementation of a separate pedagogical method—has led to a theory 
of the times that today is used to indirectly legitimize particularistic treatment.”230 
In fact, some argue that the Republican integration model represents little more than 
a name change for France’s traditional assimilationist approach. Favell describes France’s 
unwavering attachment to its integration model as “The Myth of Republican Citizenship,” 
asserting that “actual policy changes and the novelty of some of the questions posed by 
recent post-war immigration have been elided from the picture, lost in the reaffirmation of 
a particular national myth which claims that questions of immigration and integration 
would always and self-evidently be dealt with in this way.”231 Furthermore, Favell 
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identifies the following weaknesses of the French Republican model with respect to 
integration: 
a tendency to over-encourage symbolic and philosophical rhetoric rather 
than factual or empirically-rooted debate; a tendency to over-idealism, and 
inflexibility over linguistic terms, which renders difficult the application of 
philosophical ideals; a tendency to mistake rights and principles for the true 
substance of politics; an excessive focus on political life and the power of 
the state in an age when politics and traditional political power [are] in 
decline; a lack of focus on the social dimensions of integration, particularly 
the critical effect of poverty in frustrating it; a denigration and 
problematisation of culture and religion as valid political components of 
individual motivation, and hence a tendency to create political conflicts in 
these areas.232 
These deficiencies suggest that France’s commitment to its Republican vision for 
constructing a unified nation complicates its efforts to address the flaws or inadequacies of 
its policies to address contemporary immigration and integration challenges.  
H. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has presented an analysis of the French Republican state as a distinct 
context for considering multiculturalism. The legacy of the French Revolution and its 
nation-building experience were fundamental to shaping France’s societal norms and 
values and continue to color its outlook on virtually every issue. The subject of integration 
policy did not become a salient issue in French politics until the 1980s. When it did, debates 
were “explicitly couched in terms referring to the theoretical foundations of French 
political unity and cohesiveness: around grand themes of republican values, citizenship and 
the ‘traditional’ universal and cosmopolitan nature of French nationhood.”233 Adhering to 
these Republican values gave policy-makers a familiar framework with which to confront 
new challenges with the added benefit of having near universal acceptance across society 
and the political spectrum.  
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Despite waves of changing demographics and social conditions, however, France 
continuously and instinctively gravitates toward confronting contemporary integration 
challenges through the lens of its nation-building and colonial past. As a result, France’s 
“color-blind” approach to integration and refusal to recognize difference have limited its 
ability to address the difficulties of particular groups, notably within its large Muslim 
population.234 Predominantly of North and West African origin, Muslim immigrants and 
their generations of descendants, many of whom are French citizens, represent a sub-group 
that has not been smoothly integrated into French society. Despite integration’s aversion 
to communitarianism, French Muslims are often concentrated in suburban peripheries 
burdened by poverty, crime, unemployment, and social exclusion. French Muslims are also 
often blamed for the recent increase in terrorist attacks throughout France, which 
contributes to Islamophobic sentiments in society.  
The intersection of French Muslims’ cultural, ethnic, and religious attributes, often 
combined with economic disadvantage, has challenged the efficacy of the French 
Republican model’s ability to integrate them into society. Addressing this issue is 
imperative because, as Favell argues, “feasible multi-ethnic diversity makes everyone 
better off. Failure to achieve the right framework for integration, however, will lead to an 
increase in intolerance and xenophobia among majority populations, and a loss of ‘moral 
social order,’” which could have national security implications for France.235 The next 
chapter provides an analysis of the experience of Muslims in France in order to determine 




234 Béland, “Identity Politics and French Republicanism,” 66. 
235 Favell, Philosophies of Integration, 4. 
44 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
45 
III. MUSLIMS IN FRANCE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Following Chapter II’s overview of the French Republican model and its approach 
to integration, this chapter focuses on the integration of France’s Muslim minorities within 
this context. At its peak in the 1930s, the French colonial empire included a number of 
countries in Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa that were predominantly Muslim. In 
response to the enormous loss of life experienced throughout the First World War, the 
French government looked to its colonies both to augment its military forces abroad as well 
as to relieve labor shortages at home. It is estimated that close to half a million soldiers 
were deployed from colonies, including French West Africa, Algeria, Tunisia, and 
Morocco, in support of the French flag.236 Thousands more were recruited to work in 
French factories and mines. Although many of these men were repatriated following the 
First World War, 70,000 to 90,000 North Africans resided in the greater Paris region by 
the early 1930s.237 French decolonization after the Second World War brought another 
wave of immigration to France. The three decades following 1945 led millions of 
immigrants from former colonies to France in search of work.238 While most originally 
intended to be temporary workers in France, many eventually became permanent residents, 
earned citizenship and either brought families or started families in France.  
These enormous waves of immigration have had significant impacts on the French 
population, particularly with the advent of a large and growing group of French citizens 
who adhere to the Muslim faith. More often than not, Muslims are portrayed as a group 
that has not integrated well into French society; and they are often criticized for not 
embracing French culture and values more readily. Many Muslims find themselves in the 
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margins of society, both physically and socially, and significant responsibility rests with 
the French government. To better understand the dynamic, this chapter surveys the Muslim 
population in France. As the vast majority of French Muslims have immigrant origins, it 
begins with an overview of their immigration patterns and the evolution of France’s 
policies from initially encouraging to later discouraging immigration from predominantly 
Muslim countries. It then considers French Muslims’ disproportionate representation in the 
often socioeconomically disadvantaged suburban areas around France’s major cities, 
focusing specifically on the evolution and exclusive nature of the boundaries surrounding 
Paris. Finally it addresses Muslims’ ability to exercise and practice their faith in everyday 
life in France’s strict Republican, secular environment. In each area, France’s policies have 
shaped its Muslim population’s experience and integration. 
B. IMMIGRATION TRENDS 
Because French law prohibits the government’s collection of personal information 
including ethnicity and religious affiliation, precise numbers representing those who 
identify as Muslim in France are not available. That said, scholars and French government 
officials estimate that approximately five million Muslims live in France.239 It is important 
to note that for statistical purposes many scholars also employ a cultural definition of 
“Muslim,” which includes not only practicing Muslims but also those of Muslim origin 
who may not necessarily be strict religious observers.240 Figure 1 provides a breakdown 
of the Muslim population in France in 1998 by origin. Due to France’s colonial past, most 
Muslims living in France today trace their origins to former French territories.241 As a 
result, early Muslims’ experience in France was initially shaped by immigration patterns 
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and policies, which varied in terms of volume, timeframes, economic circumstances, and 
the independence status of the country of origin.  
 
Figure 1. Muslim population in France, by origin242 
France began its conquest of Algeria in 1830, eventually seizing control of large 
parts of north and west Africa.243 By the 1870s, Algeria was part of France. A first wave 
of immigration to mainland France occurred during the First World War, during which 
several hundred thousand “Meghrébins,” still colonial subjects at the time, migrated to 
France.244 Most either served in the Army fighting for France or worked in fields and 
factories in the absence of fighting French citizens. This wave was primarily composed of 
individual men seeking work. Throughout the early 1900s, “both the French government 
and private companies recruited Algerian men to metropolitan France as a source of 
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unskilled labor.”245 A larger and more sustained wave of immigration began following 
World War II due to severe labor shortages in France. During this period, migrant workers 
from North African colonies and Turkey were recruited, with their residence status 
regularized by French employers.246  
North African immigration to France had been primarily from Algeria until the 
early 1960s.247 As a result, “Algerian immigrants are three times as likely as other Muslim 
immigrants to have arrived [in France] very young and therefore to speak fluent 
French.”248 They also generally have stronger ties to France as many Algerian adults were 
“born in Algeria when it was [still] part of France.”249 By the mid-twentieth century, 
however, many French colonies had achieved independence, and immigration began to 
flow from other newly independent countries under various economic agreements.250 
Immigrants from Morocco and Tunisia began arriving in France after these nations won 
independence in 1956. “By 1974, 260,000 Moroccans and 140,000 Tunisians lived in 
France.”251 North African immigrants were most likely to work in heavy industry or 
construction.252 Bowen notes that they spoke various Berber languages and Arabic dialects 
but generally used Arabic for religious practice and had shared religious traditions rooted 
in Sunni Islam.253 Collectively, many North Africans began referring to themselves as 
“Beurs,” a slang transformation of the word “Arabes” in French.254  
By the late 1960s, large numbers of Muslim immigrants were also beginning to 
arrive in France from sub-Saharan and West Africa, primarily from Senegal, Mali, and 
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Mauritania.255 These immigrants arrived after their countries received independence in 
1960 and signed formal labor agreements with France.256 As a result, they are more likely 
than North Africans to have come to France as adults and are “less likely than North 
Africans to be legal residents or to have permanent employment.”257 Many are adherents 
of Sufi Islam and tend to maintain close ties with their religious leaders abroad.258 They 
are also more likely to live with polygamous families and to live in crowded quarters.259 
According to Bowen, it is French Muslims of West African descent that are “targeted by 
the larger society as insufficiently adapted to France, and whose problems and actions are 
most often framed in racial terms.”260  
The only significant group of Muslim immigrants without colonial ties to France 
came from Turkey. France and Turkey signed a labor accord in 1966 ushering many 
workers into the forestry, mining, and building trades.261 By 1983, there were close to 
150,000 Turks living in France, most of whom settled around Paris and in eastern 
France.262 By the 1990s, the number of Turks and Kurds in France had grown to roughly 
350,000, few of whom could speak French.263 Smaller numbers of Muslims also came 
from France’s overseas territories, including Mayotte and La Réunion, or came as asylum 
seekers from Bosnia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Pakistan.264 Due to the variation across 
immigration timeframes and circumstances, some groups’ ties to France and to each other 
are deeper than others. For example, North African Muslims immigrated to France earlier 
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and share a common religious tradition, making it somewhat easier for them to overcome 
cultural differences among each other and to form associations.265  
Initially, the French government anticipated that these Muslim workers’ presence 
in France would be temporary and that they would ultimately return to their home 
countries. As such, France’s foreign labor and immigration policies were somewhat 
inconsistent and uncoordinated throughout the early twentieth century, as noted by Nielsen 
and Otterbeck.266 Deteriorating political and economic conditions in Algeria combined 
with an improving welfare system and increased availability of public housing in France, 
however, encouraged some Algerian men to begin gradually bringing their families to 
France in the 1950s.267 As the flow of immigration increased throughout the late 1960s, 
60% of male immigrants were arriving in France with their wives and children.268 In 
response to this marked increase, the French government tried to implement policies to 
tighten its control and limit immigration to France. The French government signed an 
accord with Algeria in 1964 that set a cap for the number of immigrants allowed to come 
to France each year.269 The cap was lowered several times in subsequent years, but the 
policies proved nearly impossible to enforce.  
In 1974, France experienced an oil crisis which caused an economic recession and 
a spike in unemployment. In response, the French government ceased the recruitment of 
foreign workers and implemented a series of measures intended to curb the growing 
presence of Muslim immigrants in France.270 By this time, there were nearly 900,000 
Algerians alone already living in the country.271 Rather than returning to their home 
country, however, many instead elected to remain in France and sent for their families to 
join them. Immigration continued to be reduced, and requirements for becoming a French 
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citizen were made more restrictive. From 1977 to 1981, the French Immigration Minister, 
Lionel Stoléru, tried to reduce the number of North African immigrants in France first by 
financially incentivizing them to leave voluntarily with an offer of 10,000 francs.272 He 
later attempted to deport thousands of Muslim workers and their families and President 
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (in office from 1974 to 1981) tried to ban family reunification 
for immigrants.273 Neither of these policies received legislative support, and measures to 
reduce immigration achieved only marginal success.  
Throughout the 1970s, more and more Muslim immigrants remained in the country 
and began bringing their families and starting families in France. By 1975, “over one 
million…Muslim immigrants were living in metropolitan France.”274 This marked an 
important turning point when French leaders began to recognize a need to incorporate and 
integrate this growing Muslim population. It also marked a shift from policies intended to 
simply manage immigration flows to those designed to facilitate the integration of Muslim 
immigrants into French society.275 Gradually, large groups of Muslims in France 
transitioned from working in France temporarily to becoming permanent residents or 
French citizens. By the end of the 1990s, roughly one-third of Muslim immigrants held 
French citizenship either by birth or by naturalization.276 But despite France’s long history 
of immigration and public confidence in the Republican model of integration, Fetzer and 
Soper assert that “North African and Sub-Saharan Muslims do not, on the whole, appear 
to have been welcomed as warmly as most European immigrants have been.”277 As a 
result, many Muslims in France, both recent immigrants and descendants of earlier 
immigrants, are often caught in a cycle of socioeconomic disadvantage. The subsequent 
sections of this chapter discuss various elements of this challenge.  
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C. SPATIAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
Differing immigration patterns and policies have contributed to variations in 
settlement patterns among France’s Muslim immigrants. For example, while male Algerian 
immigrants were initially fairly spread out throughout the French industrial scene, “family-
based” Algerians became more concentrated in urban centers.278 Moroccan and Tunisian 
immigrants, having arrived in France later than most Algerians, tended to be more widely 
spread correlating with the fluctuating labor market.279 Turkish immigrants mostly settled 
in the greater Paris region but were also in Lille and Alsace-Lorraine.280 Nielsen and 
Otterbeck note that there was a distinct preference among families for settlement in Paris 
and that “black Africans” were also mainly concentrated there.281 By 1982, the majority 
of French Muslims from all the Muslim-majority countries of origin were concentrated in 
urban city centers or in peripheral ring cities around Paris, Lyon, Lille, and Marseilles.282  
Bowen asserts that “where Muslims have settled…has shaped how they interact 
and think about identity and interests.”283 Today, large concentrations of Muslim 
minorities live in suburban city outskirts commonly referred to as banlieues, which can 
contribute to a sense of exclusion from mainstream French society. Due to the high 
concentration of Muslims that settled in the Paris region, this section specifically analyzes 
the origins and perpetuation of the city’s exclusive nature and the parallel development of 
its suburban banlieues. The isolation of the banlieues stems from the evolution of Paris’ 
city limits and a series of corresponding policies that resulted in structural divisions within 
the contiguous French societies. The fluctuating nature of Paris’ boundaries for defensive 
and economic reasons has continuously displaced and excluded different groups over time, 
often those of the working class. Consequently, both tangible and intangible barriers have 
contributed to physically and socially disconnected communities in the banlieues.  
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A useful concept for this discussion is teichopolitics, which Rosière and Reece 
describe as “the politics of building barriers,” often to control movement or 
immigration.284 This is achieved by a process of border hardening, which entails the 
development of closure systems to either direct movement through various checkpoints or 
to deny it entirely. Hardening measures such as frontlines, fences, and walls “demonstrate 
that all mobilities and flows are not valued” and thus establish a hierarchy of flows.285 
Border hardening creates asymmetry because “the power to decide upon the separation…is 
monopolized by the most powerful party, while the other becomes de facto separated.”286 
Consequently, teichopolitics is often associated with the protection of privilege. In the case 
of Paris, teichopolitics has been a perennial issue contributing to spatial disparity and social 
inequality for centuries. While this process began long before Muslims arrived in France 
in great numbers, its enduring effects impact them disproportionately and thus warrants 
deeper understanding. 
Teichopolitics stems from “the ancient Greek word…teichos, meaning ‘city 
wall.’”287 Like many other European cities, Paris was surrounded by defensive walls 
throughout the Middle Ages.288 Successive walls enclosing the city were built to 
accommodate its steady expansion (see Figure 2). Just before the French Revolution, the 
Wall of the Farmers General was built. Also known as le Mur d’Octroi, the wall enclosed 
the city and functioned as a customs boundary with various points of entry where all 
outsiders were required to pay an octroi tax on commercial goods.289 La Compagnie des 
Fermiers Généraux operated the wall with proceeds supporting the royal treasury. In this 
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sense, the walls created “spatial and legal barriers to free trade and mobility for tax 
purposes, but they also created a real social boundary.”290  
 
 
Figure 2. Map of the successive fortifications of Paris291 
Due to growing instability throughout Europe, it was determined that Paris needed 
better protective measures. In 1841, a French politician, Adolphe Thiers, began the 
construction of a defensive wall, known as the Enceinte Thiers or les fortifications, and 
forbade any new construction in the zone directly outside it.292 The new bastioned 
enclosure doubled the size of the city from 8,125 acres to 17,515, engulfing the large area 
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between the octroi walls which came to be known as the “Petite Banlieue.”293 In 1860, a 
decree was proclaimed annexing the suburban communities, redistributing the land into 
twenty arrondissements, and officially extending the city limits to les fortifications.294 
Those who had been living within the free-zone between the two walls were promptly 
required to pay the octroi tax.295 Many workers and industries could not afford to do so 
and were thus forced to relocate outside the city.296 This drastic change was implemented 
by the government with little concern for the 1.6 million residents affected by it.297 
Following this annexation, Baron Georges-Eugene Haussmann, Prefect of the 
Seine, was hired by Emperor Napoleon III to modernize the city. This enormous project 
included significant improvements to Paris’ transportation infrastructure, sanitation 
systems, and overall design, but involved razing entire medieval quarters of the city, 
demolishing over 19,000 historic buildings and building 34,000 new ones.298 As a result, 
many working class residents were either physically displaced by the renovations or priced 
out and again forced to relocate outside the city. 
As renovations in Paris continued throughout the early twentieth century, its 
population density steadily grew. From the early 1920s onward, the French government 
utilized its suburbs to build cheap housing for its laborer and growing immigrant 
populations, initially coming from Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Eastern Europe, and to 
prevent the development of shantytowns or “bidonvilles.”299 Decolonization of the former 
French Empire and Algerian independence eventually brought the large waves of 
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immigrants from predominantly Muslim countries in Northern and Western Africa. In the 
1950s, “the state built hostels and low-rent apartments for single workers near factories 
and away from city centers” in order to ensure that immigration was closely correlated with 
specific labor needs.300 
Following World War II, large housing projects were constructed in the vacant 
areas outside the former Thiers fortifications. A famous architect, Charles-Edouard 
Jeanneret, often referred to as Le Corbusier, is credited with influencing these cités or 
projects throughout the banlieues, designed to be “utopian residential complexes.”301 
Throughout les Trente Glorieuses, or “The Glorious Thirty,” (1945-1975) France was 
eager to rebuild its economy and harness the influx of immigration. Although during this 
period the French government sought to encourage migrant workers to stay by improving 
their housing conditions, it deliberately opted to house new immigrants in these projects in 
banlieues of Paris, Marseille, and Lyon, mainly to hide them from public view.302 
Similarly, the French government constructed subsidized public housing units 
called habitations à loyer modéré (HLMs) or “moderate income residences,” which 
Castaneda attributes to “the rise of the French welfare state and the increasing cost of living 
in Paris.”303 These were often large disconnected buildings, each containing about 500 
apartments but which often held thousands of residents.304 Originally, these residences 
were primarily occupied by French working class families. Eventually, however, many 
factories closed and most families with positive economic prospects moved away. As a 
result, the resident populations of the HLMs evolved to consist primarily of immigrant 
workers from former French colonies.305 This left the banlieues of Paris full of dead-end 
housing complexes with little opportunity for employment or economic improvement for 
their inhabitants. As of 1999, “50 percent of all North African immigrants, 37 percent of 
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other African immigrants, and 36 percent of Turkish immigrants” lived in these housing 
complexes.306  
Today, France is organized into 13 administrative regions, with each divided into 
departments and then into municipalities or “communes.” The Paris metropolitan area is 
located within the administrative region Ile-de-France, which contains eight departments and 
is the most densely populated in France with 11,786,234 inhabitants in 2010.307 Of the nearly 
12 million Ile-de-France residents, only 2.2 million live within the city of Paris.308 The 
suburbs on the western side of the city are the most wealthy while those to the north and 
southeast tend to be more disadvantaged, with many residents of immigrant origins. The term 
“banlieusards” is usually used to describe residents of the lower income suburbs, who do not 
enjoy the same access to quality education, transportation, and employment opportunities and 
hold that they are often treated like second-class citizens.309  
Their spatial disconnect is manifested in the 35km périphérique ring road that 
encircles Paris in place of the old Thiers fortifications, physically separating the city from its 
banlieues. Lambert conducted an analysis of pedestrian access to Paris and found that at the 
northern and eastern edges of the city, crossing the périphérique into the city required either 
passing under the highway by way of long, dark tunnels, or passing over it on some form of 
a suspended bridge, whereas at many points along the western and wealthier side of the city, 
the highway itself was moved underground so that residents could simply cross the threshold 
unhindered.310 In this way, the périphérique, sometimes referred to as a “social frontier,” acts 
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as a border that selectively prevents access for some more than others and contributes to a 
sense of alterity between those within and those outside the city proper.311  
Transportation is another important area in which spatial disadvantages exacerbate 
other disparities between Paris and its banlieues. While the city is very well connected within 
its inner limits, it becomes much more disconnected outside the périphérique. Paris’ primary 
commuter rail lines, the Metro and the RER, extend out into the banlieues with routes 
becoming more distant from each other the farther away from the city (see Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3. Transportation infrastructure in metropolitan Paris, 2010.312 
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With few options to travel between the banlieues, residents of these housing 
developments must inefficiently travel to Paris and back out again in order to visit 
neighboring banlieues. Gaining access to employment opportunities also makes having 
access to a train station exceedingly important, but roughly half of the major cités are 
located outside the radius of a fifteen minute walking distance and therefore require using 
an intermediate form of transportation to reach the train.313 Garcia-Lopez et al. note that 
“transportation plays a crucial role in the spatial distribution of residences and firms within 
cities” finding that proximity to a train station increases the likelihood of a suburban 
municipality becoming part of an employment subcenter in Paris by 5% to 10%.314 Thus, 
the absence of a train station prevents both the development of employment opportunities 
in one’s own vicinity and travel to employment elsewhere. 
In the case of Paris, “a number of policies have been instrumental in re-establishing 
and perpetuating the high social status of the city, and in encouraging selective outward 
migration.”315 Teichopolitics has played an important role in contributing to the hardening 
of physical and social barriers around the city that make it significantly more difficult for 
the Muslim minority and immigrant populations within them to access it. As Rosière and 
Jones explain, “as barriers are put up, both symbolically and literally, they institutionalize 
and expand inequality”316  
Spatial disconnect amplifies other forms of disadvantage for French Muslims. 
Minimal economic growth, marginal transportation infrastructure, and poor education 
opportunities have contributed to disproportionately high levels of unemployment for 
residents of the banlieues, where the rate can be three times the national average.317 
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According to Nielson and Otterbeck, “the large majority of people of Muslim background 
in France are employed in unskilled and semiskilled occupations in industry.”318 Because 
of this, “the children of especially North African immigrants have continuously been 
vulnerable to the effects of economic slowdown” and “young Arabs” were 
disproportionately affected by unemployment throughout the 1990s.319 Immigrant and 
Muslim minorities have accordingly struggled to gain economic stability in France, let 
alone upward social mobility. 
Laurence and Vaïsse note the destabilizing effect on families of unemployment, 
which discourages children’s expectations for their own prospects for the future and often 
contributes to lower motivation in school.320 This has coincided with a high rate of 
criminal behavior and minor delinquency in the banlieues. As a result, French Muslims are 
overrepresented in prisons, a situation which these authors attribute to a general sense of 
alienation and socioeconomic desperation.321 This has contributed to a negative perception 
of French Muslims in the banlieues.  
Bowen cites a 2005 French study on employment that examined the impact of 
ethnicity on employment rates. The report found that “ having a North African background 
makes you two and a half times more likely to be unemployed than if you are (or, more 
importantly, if you look and sound) ‘native French’”322 But while racism is a significant 
intersecting issue for French Muslims, Rhein found that social status in economic terms 
has actually been more significant regarding patterns of residential segregation than has 
national origins.323 Numerous studies over the years have revealed discrimination in hiring 
processes as a result of applicants’ foreign-sounding names or mailing addresses in the 
banlieues. Perception of “linguistic prestige” is another element closely tied to cities’ 
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reputations and stereotypes that uniquely disadvantage those in the banlieues.324 
Additionally, a 2015 OECD survey revealed that of “72 countries, France was the country 
where a student’s social, economic, and cultural background had the greatest effect on 
school performance.”325 Ultimately, French Muslims’ inability to achieve full 
socioeconomic integration has perpetuated a cycle of poverty and social alienation. 
D. RELIGIOUS PRACTICE AND ACCOMMODATION 
As discussed in the previous chapter, religion occupies a unique space in the French 
context. While France remains a largely Christian country, Republican laïcité ensures that 
Catholicism does not influence politics or public life. This has coincided with a general 
decrease in Christian religious practice within the population, with weekly church 
attendance down to 7% and only 59% who claim to ever attend church.326 For Islam, 
however, the trend has been somewhat the opposite. While early Muslim migrant workers 
and immigrants may have settled for reduced support or opportunities for religious practice, 
younger generations have demonstrated a marked tendency to practice Islam more strictly 
and to demand greater accommodation from the state. This section discusses how the state 
has addressed the growth of Islam within its borders and within the structure of Republican 
laïcité. 
1. Mosques 
Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, both the French government and 
most first-generation Muslim immigrants, themselves, expected their work in France to be 
temporary.327 As a result, many Muslim workers, who were mostly single males at the 
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time, were content to practice their faith “with little fanfare.” 328 As there was not a strong 
demand on the state to provide religious accommodations for non-citizens and temporary 
workers, religious practice and makeshift facilities remained quite modest. Kepel describes 
this phenomenon as “cellar Islam,” which was prevalent until the early 1970s.329 In the 
mid-1970s, workers living in hostels around Paris went on strike to protest increasing rents 
and poor treatment by hostel employees.330 In addition to these complaints, workers at the 
Billancourt Renault factory outside Paris also demanded a prayer space on the factory 
grounds.331 The factory owners granted the request, mainly because they saw the prayer 
space as an inexpensive way to appease workers, but similar events began to highlight a 
growing need for Muslims in France to have places to worship. 
Article 2 of the December 1905 law concerning the separation of church and state 
does not “grant recognition to, pay the salaries of, or provide subsidies for any religion.”332 
However, the law included a provision for state support for the conservation of churches 
that existed before 1905.333 As adherents of a newer religion in France, however, Muslims 
did not inherit any property from this arrangement and thus generally do not enjoy state 
support for clergy or places of worship.334 An important exception to this rule is the 
Grande Mosquée de Paris or the Paris Mosque, which was built in 1926 specifically to 
recognize the contributions of North and West Africans who fought for France during the 
First World War.335 Aside from this, Muslims have struggled to construct mosques and 
other prayer spaces in France.  
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In the late 1960s, “publicly identifiable” Muslim places of worship became more 
prevalent as fewer Muslim immigrants returned to their home countries and as their 
families arrived in France and grew.336 The demand for appropriate Muslim prayer spaces 
has accordingly increased substantially since the 1970s with the growing presence of the 
largely North African immigrant population in France.337 The number of prayer rooms in 
France increased from around 100 to 500 between 1970 and 1985, often resulting from 
strikes similar to the one at the Renault factory.338 By that time, 80% of workers’ hostels 
had Muslim prayer rooms.339 Throughout the early 1990s, France experienced further 
growth in the number of Muslim places of worship, which were primarily “small locations 
in apartment blocks on housing estates, known as foyers.”340 Bowen notes that “it was 
(and is) not unusual to find two prayer spaces in one housing complex, with one used by 
the North African [Muslims] and the other by West African [Muslims].”341 For a number 
of reasons, including language preference, ethnic solidarity, or religious tradition, mosques 
in France tend to draw adherents from the same country of origin. 
Of note, France does not have guidelines or administrative requirements established 
in order to classify Muslim places of worship.342 Until the 1960s, the Mosquée de Paris 
was the only building to be officially titled a mosque in France.343 Other places of worship 
were often instead called salles de prière or “prayer rooms.”344 Until the early 1980s, 
“most of the larger structures used for congregational prayers, and thus called mosques, 
were located in large warehouses, houses, or apartment buildings,” according to Bowen.345 
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In the early 2000s, the Ministry of the Interior documented 1,600 Muslim prayer houses.346 
In 2006, “a specialist on Islam in France counted 2,150 places of worship of which [only] 
twenty could host more than 1,000 people.”347 
While the number of Muslim places of worship has grown significantly over the 
last several decades, Fetzer and Soper estimate that as of 2000, France had only “one 
mosque or prayer room for every 3,333 Muslims.”348 With the shortage of mosques, many 
French Muslims continue to resort to converting other structures into prayer spaces or using 
the common rooms or basements of housing complexes. Collectively, fewer than 10% of 
mosques in France were “purpose-built” and most do not hold more than fifty people.349 
This sometimes results in people overflowing into the streets and adjacent areas. 
Additionally, many prayer spaces are materially inadequate. For example, of Marseille’s 
seventy-three prayer spaces, half are estimated to be lacking hot water or functional 
plumbing.350  
Muslims still struggle today to establish mosques and prayer spaces in France. As 
Bowen explains, many in France see “large mosques as incompatible with the French built 
landscape” but are similarly “offended by the sight of Muslims praying in the street on 
feast days, when the available buildings did not suffice.”351 The challenge often stems 
from local political opposition, as city mayors traditionally have the final say on granting 
permission to construct a new mosque or to convert an existing structure.352 The topic can 
be highly politicized and the success of a particular campaign is usually dependent on the 
city’s political climate and the size of its Muslim electorate.353  
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It is not uncommon for non-Muslim groups to launch petitions or stage 
demonstrations protesting the construction of mosques. Even for those who are initially 
supportive of Muslims’ endeavors, these events can be highly discouraging for local 
leaders who must concern themselves with reelection. Other leaders, however, can be 
completely unsupportive and more aggressive in their efforts to block Muslim prayer 
spaces. For example, in 1983 a mayor in Charvieu, near Lyon, launched an urban renewal 
project that would evict a community of Muslims from a converted cafeteria that they were 
using as a makeshift prayer space.354 In response, the local imam offered to leave the 
cafeteria in exchange for a new prayer space elsewhere. The city declined this offer, so the 
Muslim community worked to purchase a small property. When the Muslims applied for a 
building permit to construct a mosque, the mayor refused to sign it. Left with no other 
option, the Muslims continued to pray in the cafeteria. In August 1989, the mayor ordered 
the building to be bulldozed with people still praying inside, injuring three individuals and 
causing outrage from the Muslim community. In response, the mayor from a neighboring 
city, Grenoble, arranged for the delivery of a temporary, prefabricated structure for the 
Muslims to use as a mosque.355 Two years later, the same mayor of Charvieu directed 
them to leave this temporary facility and proceeded to cut off its water supply when they 
refused.356  
While this may represent one of the more extreme examples, it is representative of 
the struggle Muslims have faced when seeking to establish legitimate prayer spaces in 
France. While the Republican state does not bar the establishment of mosques, it certainly 
does not promote them or provide much legal protection to support them at the local level. 
Moreover, the mosques and prayer spaces that are established can be subject to severe 
harassment and vandalism from their local communities. In 1982, a mosque in another 
town near Lyon was blown up using plastic explosives, and the perpetrators were never 
held accountable.357  
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2. Embassy Islam 
One solution for Muslims struggling to establish mosques in France has been for 
foreign states to sponsor them. According to Bowen, “large mosques in France have 
depended on foreign states, associations, or private donors for at least part of their funding” 
and “ some may have received their initial funding from a single state.”358 This dynamic 
has stemmed partly from the practice of “Embassy Islam,” which Laurence defines as “the 
international advocacy, summitry, and intervention on behalf of the Islamic minority in 
Europe.”359 In this way, the governments of majority-Muslim sending states have 
maintained significant influence over the organization and practice of Islam for their 
diasporas in Europe. This approach can be observed in France’s early dealings with its 
Muslim communities and has impacted their integration into French society.  
Laurence asserts that foreign Islamic governments enjoyed a privileged status in 
Europe from about 1960 to 1990 mainly due to European governments’ desire to maintain 
good trade relations, avoid the politicization of migrant populations, and ensure that 
migrant workers were poised to return to their home countries.360 Sending nations also had 
reasons for wanting to remain involved with their diasporas abroad, namely that 
remittances sent home by migrant workers contributed to their economic growth and 
development. Sending countries also feared that “dissidents abroad might seek to gather 
forces to effect policy changes, or change of regime, at home.”361 In this sense, European 
governments’ interests largely aligned with those of the sending nations. They therefore 
embraced primarily “return-oriented” policies and viewed their Muslim populations as an 
“object of diplomatic geostrategy.” 362  
By the mid-1970s, European governments began to recognize the need for 
interlocutors to assist with attending to the “basic religious needs” of their Muslim 
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populations.363 To address this concern, many encouraged the establishment of embassies 
and welcomed “representatives of the official Islams of the Muslim world.”364 To this end, 
European governments began “importing imams and allowing foreign governments to 
sponsor mosques construction.”365 On the whole, European governments “were content to 
‘outsource’ the day-to-day management of Islamic religious observance” to representatives 
from the embassies and consulates of Muslim immigrants’ sending states.366 France even 
signed a “mini shari’a accord,” which included a number of bilateral conventions with 
Algeria to address matters of “inheritance, repatriation of the deceased, polygamy, and 
divorce” for foreign Muslim workers.367 In 1981, France also signed a convention with 
Morocco that “obligated judges to apply Moroccan Islamic law in family law matters…for 
first-generation Moroccans living in France.”368 As Laurence simply describes the policy 
rationale, “not seeing the guestworkers and their offspring as destined for citizenship, and 
believing Islam, as the religion of foreigners, ‘an exogenous reality,’ the host societies tried 
their best to avoid the hard questions of Islam’s status in European societies.”369  
During this time, most linguistic, cultural, and religious programs for Muslims in 
France were carried out by representatives from their sending nations and were oriented to 
encourage identification with their home countries and to anticipate an eventual 
homecoming. These representatives were known to favor the use of non-European 
languages, especially for religious education, and “the imams they exported were also 
unlikely to have command of the language of the host society.”370 They encouraged 
Muslims in Europe to participate in the elections of their home countries and “continued a 
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pretense of political representation for migrant-origin Muslims who are rapidly becoming 
a majority of European citizenship-holders.”371  
Throughout the 1980s, as many Muslims were gaining European citizenship, the 
motives of some sending countries evolved somewhat as they sought to maintain a 
“guardian status” over diaspora groups in Europe in order to preserve political and religious 
influence abroad.372 Many sought to temper the influence of Islam from rival sending 
countries and thus began advancing their own variety of Islam more deliberately. To this 
end, the primary sending countries to France – Algeria, Morocco, and Turkey – each 
developed “a robust practice of exporting their official Islam to the diaspora.”373 This 
contributed to the hardening of lines between not only Muslims and their European hosts, 
but also between Muslims hailing from different sending countries.  
Due to the practice of Embassy Islam and French Muslims’ difficulties establishing 
religious infrastructure in France, a structured process or institution for training local 
imams never fully materialized. As a result, both the quality and quantity of legitimate 
imams remain a struggle as qualifications to become an imam are not standardized. It is 
also challenging to find imams that are willing to work for the “relatively low wages that 
[their] congregations can afford to pay.”374 According to Laurence, two thirds of imams 
in France are on welfare.375 Because of this, the majority of imams in France were “born, 
raised, and trained outside of Europe—if they were trained at all.”376 Only one out of every 
five imams has French citizenship, most of whom were only recently naturalized.377 As a 
result, many imams lack adequate religious training and may have a poor understanding of 
their respective communities’ local societies.378  
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By the 1990s, European governments began to recognize the shortfalls of the 
Embassy Islam arrangement, notably the lack of encouragement for Muslims to integrate 
into their societies. As Laurence summarizes, “both the European governments and Muslim 
states purposely worked against integration for decades by promoting native language 
retention and the maintenance of distinct cultural and religious identities that did not mingle 
with the majority society – the very traits that would later be cited as evidence of failure to 
integrate.”379 
3. Associations 
Another important factor that has shaped the experience of Muslims in France and 
their relationship with the state is the development of associations. Seemingly contrary to 
the French Republic’s typical aversion to sub-groups, France passed a law in July 1901 
granting the right to form associations, so long as they are registered with the state.380 
Chapter IV of France’s 1905 law concerning the separation of church and state extended 
this authorization to the formation of religious associations.381 The law on associations 
initially applied to foreigners and immigrants but was suspended in 1939 due to the growth 
of fascist organizations linked to Germany and Italy.382 Authorization for foreigners and 
immigrants to form associations was restored in 1981. With that came a significant growth 
in the number of associations formed by Muslim residents, many of which had already 
existed informally.383 This significant change, however, meant that groups could then 
formally register with the state and receive subsidies from France’s Fund for Social Action 
(FAS).384 
Bowen explains that in the French context, these associations were not intended to 
contribute to the formation of cultural, ethnic, or religious communities, which the 
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Republican state strongly opposes, but instead to address the shared interests of various 
groups.385 In reality, however, associations have proven to be a “major vehicle for the 
development of cultural and religious identities in France.”386 To this end, he notes that 
cultural associations may offer social services and promote cultural heritage and religious 
associations may promote religious identity by combining extra-curricular activities such 
as sports or academic tutoring with religious education.387 Many religious associations 
also sponsor prayer spaces and were largely responsible for their significant increase in 
number from roughly 500 in 1985 to 1,279 in 1992 and to about 1,600 by 2003.388 
Mosques and prayer spaces are not only significant for their spiritual functions but 
represent an important part of society for French Muslims. They are known to provide 
general instruction, tutoring, and social services, and have come to be an important element 
of political representation.389 In this way, “associations involving Muslims, only some of 
them religious, have come to provide a major set of pathways to integration.”390  
Many Muslim associations also affiliated themselves with transnational networks 
led by foreign governments or international non-government organizations.391 Similar to 
the dynamic affecting mosques, most Muslim associations in France have a particular 
national orientation.392 Roughly 60% of Muslim associations fall under three main 
umbrella organizations or “federations:” the Moroccan-dominated National Federation of 
Muslims in France (FNMF); the Union of Islamic Organizations in France (UOIF), which 
is associated with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and the Grande Mosquée de Paris 
(GMP), which is heavily Algerian-oriented.393 These federations are thought to represent 
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only 10 to 15% of Muslims in France, however.394 Due to its unique origins, the GMP has 
had the closest ties to the state. According to Bowen, it has maintained a reputation as “the 
most moderate Islamic institution in France” and thus has been the government’s preferred 
partner in its efforts to “domesticate Islam…to form a national Islamic body around the 
mosque.”395 Even with the state’s support for the GMP to become the general 
representative of Islam in France, it failed to gain recognition from Muslims of other North 
African, West African, and Turkish origins.396 
By the late 1980s, the French government began to recognize that the GMP’s 
espousal of Algerian Islam was not adequately representative of all French Muslims. 
France also hoped to continue reducing the influence of foreign nations’ agendas on 
internal French affairs. To address this, the government sought to “domesticate,” a 
described by Laurence, or institutionalize Islam in France by further structuring and 
formalizing relations with the state.397 The French Minister of the Interior, Pierre Joxe, 
launched a Council of Reflection on Islam in France (CORIF) in 1989.398 Composed of a 
broad group of Muslim leaders, the council was not intended to be a representative council 
but instead to advise on religious needs. In 1999, however, Jean-Pierre Chevènement, then 
the Minister of the Interior, initiated dialogue about an unprecedented “grand forum” of 
Muslim federations to consult upon the religious needs of Muslims in France that was 
formally recognized by the French state.399 After several years of deliberation among 
committees and working groups to agree on its structure and election processes, the French 
Council of the Muslim Religion (CFCM) was established under Nicolas Sarkozy, then the 
Minister of the Interior, in 2003. Leadership positions on the council were granted to the 
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primary Muslim federations and a representative electorate was established with over 4,000 
delegates based on the square-footage of their respective prayer spaces.400 
Composed of twenty-five regional councils and a general assembly, French 
Muslims “achieved one of the highest levels of formal, national unity in Europe” with the 
establishment of the CFCM.401 The CFCM was a culmination of the state’s attempt to 
form an official representative Muslim body to address matters of religion. In view of 
arrangements that already existed for Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish religions, the state 
hoped to have a single national interlocutor that could function as a “denominational 
representative” as envisioned in Chapter IV of the 1905 law separating church and state.402 
Nevertheless, the council has proven to have some important limitations. First, the CFCM 
only addresses matters pertaining to the practice of Islam and is not intended to represent 
Muslims themselves.403 It is therefore geared towards practicing Muslims and does not 
address Muslim cultural issues. Second, the council’s election process has exposed the 
internal divisions and power struggles that persist between French Muslims.404 Moreover, 
President Sarkozy also made the controversial decision that the council’s first president 
would be the rector of the Grande Mosquée de Paris, Dalil Boubakeur, the state favorite 
traditionally associated with Algerian Islam.405 For these reasons, the council still 
struggles to adequately represent Muslim issues and to maintain legitimacy across the 
diverse groups of Muslims within France.  
4. Schools and Religious Education 
As discussed in the previous chapter, public schools play a central role within the 
French Republican context and are seen as important tools for integration and national 
unity. They are also envisaged as the quintessential secular Republican institution. 
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Nevertheless, religious communities are permitted to establish their own schools and to 
receive some public funding “as part of the agreement between church and state reached at 
the beginning of the twentieth century.”406 As long as schools agreed to teach the national 
curriculum and would admit pupils of any denomination, the state agreed to finance their 
teachers.407 Under the Debré law, passed in December 1959, private schools may apply 
for state funding once they meet certain requirements: “1) that their school has already 
been functioning for five years; 2) that their teachers are well qualified; 3) that the ‘number 
of students’ is relatively large; and 4) that the school facilities are ‘clean.’”408 In addition 
to accepting students from all religious backgrounds, religious education classes must be 
optional for all students.409 Important benefits of this status include that teachers’ salaries 
are paid by the state, families receive a subsidy for each child’s tuition, and the school’s 
curriculum and diplomas are officially recognized.410 
While a number of Christian and Jewish schools have achieved this status, the 
requirements have proven very difficult to achieve for Muslims in France due to financial 
constraints and a lack of qualified teachers. Additionally, as Bowen explains, “given that 
many French see ‘integrating Muslims’ as an unfinished task, they carry different attitudes 
toward Muslim schools than toward Catholic or Jewish schools.”411 There is even 
disagreement among French Muslims as some are strongly in favor of Muslim schools 
while others share the concern of many non-Muslims that separate schools will lead to 
“ghettoization” of Muslim students.412 Under these conditions, the first publicly 
subsidized Muslim school in France was not achieved until 2003.413 As of 2015, however, 
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there were also roughly forty-five privately funded Muslim schools in France, which often 
include Arabic instruction and are permitted to offer a religiously oriented education.414  
Due to the cost of tuition and the fact that there are fewer religious and private 
schools in the urban areas where many Muslims live, most Muslim children attend state 
public schools.415 But with only four Muslim public schools and 8,847 Catholic schools 
as of 2008, a significant number of French Muslims have also opted to send their children 
to Catholic schools, which they have found to be more accommodating of Islam than state 
public schools.416 This is often to avoid the stringent secular requirements of the state 
public schools where Muslim students experience a complete suppression of their religion 
and struggle to receive accommodations for religious sensitivities regarding issues such as 
overnight field trips with co-ed sleeping arrangements, co-ed physical education classes, 
halal meat in cafeterias, and support for fasting during Ramadan.417 
The national curriculum is another sensitive issue for French Muslims. As students 
in state schools, they receive no religious education and receive only a brief factual 
introduction to Islam within the standardized history curriculum of the French equivalent 
of the United States’ seventh grade.418 Since state-subsidized Catholic schools are allowed 
to offer voluntary religious education courses, some have pursued offering Islamic 
instruction “in parallel with” Catholic instruction, often in consultation with a local 
imam.419 By the end of the 1980s, many mosques had also begun offering Islamic 
instruction for the increasing number of French Muslim children.420 
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5. The Headscarf Affair 
The issue of strict secularism in French state schools came to a head in October 
1989 with the Affaire du Voile (veil) or Foulard (scarf). In this case, a public secondary 
school north of Paris expelled three Muslim schoolgirls after refusing to remove their 
headscarves or hijab, which the school considered to be in violation of laïcité.421 The girls 
were allowed to return to school with their headscarves on the condition that they lower 
them to their shoulders when in the classroom. Ten days later, the girls again refused to 
lower their scarves and were suspended from classes.422 Muslim girls in other schools 
throughout France began to refuse to lower their scarves in solidarity, and multiple 
demonstrations were organized to protest what they perceived to be direct discrimination 
against Muslims. Headscarves were eventually permitted in schools on the condition that 
they were not to be used for proselytizing.423 The guidance promulgated by the Conseil 
d’État in 1989 and later codified in the 2004 law “prohibiting the wearing of conspicuous 
religious symbols” was somewhat ambiguous and subject to individual interpretation, 
however.424 Today, whether Muslim students are permitted to wear the hijab in school still 
often depends largely on the orientation of its principal.425  
The 1989 incident sparked a national debate with significant media coverage 
surrounding freedom of religion and the right to education.426 While a precise number is 
not universally agreed upon, many Muslim girls were expelled from school and deprived 
of a normal state education. Left with several undesirable options, some girls continued 
classes through distance learning but experienced difficulty on the French standardized 
test, le bac, which is a crucial step determining one’s professional path after secondary 
school.427 Some families could afford to hire private tutors or lawyers to fight to have 
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expulsions overturned in court. Many working-class Muslim families could not afford 
these options, however, so some girls were forced to abandon their education.428 This can 
be particularly crippling in a country like France, which has a highly competitive and rigid 
education system. 
The hijab issue was complex from both the Muslim and the non-Muslim 
perspective.429 Some Muslim girls in France supported and welcomed the law as a 
validation for their preference to not wear the hijab in school while others feared that they 
would be ridiculed by family and friends for not wearing it. Others wanted to wear the 
hijab and felt it should be their right. Conflicting demands from family, friends, and schools 
caused significant distress, even driving one young Muslim girl to attempt suicide.430 The 
state’s central arguments against the hijab were that wearing it on school grounds was a 
direct violation of public schools’ secular nature, that it was a tool of oppression against 
women, and that it was an indication of fundamentalism among France’s Muslim 
population.431 Ultimately, however, expelling Muslim girls from school only impedes 
their ability to integrate into society and the workforce. 
According to Fetzer and Soper, “for many Muslims, the education system in the 
West is viewed as hostile to their religious values” and is preferential toward Christian 
religious traditions.432 Moreover, while the state advocates laïcité as a means of protecting 
religious freedom, many French Muslims perceive it as “a direct attack on their religious 
faith and on their efforts to transmit their religious beliefs to the next generation.”433 The 
headscarf affair is just one example of the ongoing conflict between laïcité and the practice 
of Islam that has led many French Muslims to feel they are being targeted and marginalized 
by society and the government. The issue of the hijab was largely a symbolic one, as the 
number of headscarf-wearing French Muslims has always been quite low, but both sides 
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have regarded it as an important boundary-defining moment in the relationship between 
French Muslims and the state.434  
6. Religious Accommodation Conclusion 
As demonstrated in previous sections of this chapter, Muslims have consistently 
struggled to practice their faith in France. This is due in part to the fact that the French 
government did not initially feel a sense of responsibility to accommodate Islam. When 
most of the Muslims in France were still primarily temporary migrant workers, the 
government exercised a policy of “Embassy Islam” and was content to leave the 
administration of Islam to representatives from Muslim-majority states. An interest shared 
with the French government at the time, these representatives embraced “return-oriented” 
messages and did not promote the integration of Muslims into French society.435 Once a 
significant number of Muslims began remaining in France and becoming citizens, however, 
the state was finally forced to consider the needs of this growing, religiously-defined 
population.  
State religious accommodation can be defined as “the degree to which a 
government, through its policies, makes it possible for [religious] needs to be met.”436 This 
is primarily determined by existing church-state structures.437 In France’s case, the church-
state policy inherited by Muslims was a strictly secular laïcité, which relegates religion 
entirely to the private domain. This structure allows little room for Muslims to advocate 
for the state to provide support for their religious accommodation. As Bowen notes, 
however, “France is striking for the coexistence of explicit and legally enshrined 
secularism, on the one hand, and equally vigorous state and municipal engagement with 
representatives of religious groups, on the other.”438 The right to form associations 
provided an important loophole both for Muslims seeking recognition and for the state to 
 
434 Laurence and Vaïsse, Integrating Islam, 165. 
435 Laurence, The Emancipation of Europe’s Muslims, 30–31. 
436 Fetzer and Soper, Muslims and the State, 23. 
437 Fetzer and Soper, 18. 
438 Bowen, Can Islam Be French?, 33. 
78 
be able to work with particular groups while maintaining the spirit of Republican laïcité. 
With this framework, the French government has invested significant effort in its attempts 
to support and leverage Muslim associations and federations as an effective way to 
interface with the religion and to promote acceptance of Islam in France within agreed 
limits. These federations, however, have not yet managed to capture enough popular 
support across the diverse Muslim population in France to be effective as state 
interlocutors. 
In this context, Muslims in France have been fighting a mostly uphill battle to reach 
the same level of access, infrastructure, and acceptance enjoyed by other faiths. Because 
Catholicism was already deeply established by the time France adopted laïcité, it was able 
to retain more of what it had already achieved. Additionally, the Catholic Church “won 
important concessions” in the early twentieth century concerning education, and the state 
continues to provide support to churches that existed before 1905.439 As a newer religion 
in France, Islam was not able to benefit from any pre-existing arrangements or 
infrastructure and is thus disproportionately disadvantaged by laïcité in France.  
In Fetzer and Soper’s words, “the societal and political environment in France is 
surprisingly hostile to public accommodation of Muslims’ religious practices.”440 French 
Muslims have accordingly struggled to achieve basic religious accommodations including 
prayer spaces and mosques and have had little success in establishing private or Muslim-
affiliated public schools. Moreover, issues such as the headscarf affair have led French 
Muslims to feel discriminated against and targeted by the state policy of laïcité. With 
minimal support from the state, some French Muslims have been forced to rely on foreign 
support, becoming beholden to their sponsoring nations or organizations. For example, one 
Muslim private school in France lost financial support from a Gulf state when the sponsors 
learned its classrooms had mixed gender seating.441 Likewise, the state’s early attempts to 
“outsource” the management and leadership of Islam in France prevented the development 
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of an organic French Islam that could have potentially been better adapted to the 
Republican state model. Instead, this practice only hindered French Muslims’ integration 
into society. As Laurence emphasizes, “state-mosque relations are of vital importance 
because these institutional links with religious communities prepare the ground for long-
term political integration.”442  
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter provided an overview of France’s Muslim population and the policies 
that affected their initial settlement and integration into French society. Because most 
French Muslims have an immigrant background and can trace their origins to former 
French territories and colonies, immigration policies were most significant in their initial 
experiences in France. The French government’s policies encouraged economic 
immigration from the early twentieth century until the late 1960s to early 1970s. During 
this period, there was a major shift in favor of policies that discouraged immigration and 
even sought to deport Muslims already living in France.  
Because Muslim workers were not originally expected to remain in France, the state 
did not concern itself with their integration into society. Instead, it embraced housing 
policies that intentionally located Muslim migrant workers out of sight and on the outskirts 
of major cities. The evolution and hardening of Paris’ boundaries demonstrate the city’s 
consistently exclusive nature and its contribution to the development of isolated and 
impoverished banlieues. Presently, the suburban banlieues and their projects are home to a 
high concentration of Muslims and foreign-born residents whose struggle with persistent 
socioeconomic disadvantages precludes them from the education and employment 
opportunities that could facilitate integration and upward social mobility.  
From the religious perspective, France forfeited its ability to influence the 
development and practice of Islam when it embraced a policy allowing the international 
administration of the religion. As Laurence observes, “Europeans’ demand for 
spokespeople and interlocutors was destined to change once outsourcing and laissez-faire 
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became counterproductive, and when they collectively realized the cost of having 
intentionally sacrificed immigrant integration on the altar of short-term pragmatism.”443 
While French interests initially aligned with those of Muslim-majority sending states in 
advocating return-oriented approaches, the government later recognized the cost of 
hindering Muslims’ overall integration when they began to stay in large numbers. Laurence 
and Vaïsse contend that “by the late 1980s, many politicians and policymakers agreed that 
Muslims in France had been all but abandoned by the state.”444 By this time, younger 
generations of Muslims born in France were coming of age and “sought more public and 
civic ways to achieve equal rights and recognition as French citizens”445  
Nielsen and Otterbeck discuss trends identified in French surveys measuring the 
“degree to which people of Muslim cultural origin in France are also practicing 
Muslims.”446 Findings indicated a major decline in religious adherence from Muslim 
immigrant parents to their children from the 1980s to the early 2000s. At this point, 
however, the trend reversed and surveys revealed a noteworthy increase in activities such 
as prayer attendance and other Muslim rituals, including fasting. According to Bowen, 
“some men and women thought that Islam would offer an identity that would distinguish 
them from both their parents and from the native French society that did not seem to want 
them.”447 As a result, younger generations of Muslims have demanded more support for 
their religious practice and expression in public. They have also sought to deepen their 
relationship with Islam by forming associations and by learning more about their faith. Due 
to the persistent absence of legitimate Islamic religious authority in France, however, they 
can potentially be influenced by young men with little to no formal religious education or 
by foreign imams who may have a political agenda.  
In conclusion, to assert that Muslims have not done enough to integrate in France 
provides an incomplete picture and ignores the significant role played by the French state 
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in ostracizing them. Throughout the twentieth century, the French government deliberately 
implemented policies that hindered the geographic, socioeconomic, and religious 
integration of Muslims into society. Furthermore, France has done “precious little 
positively to accommodate Muslim’s religious practices” and has instead “exerted all too 
much effort to make Muslims’ life even more difficult than it already is for this largely 
immigrant-origin, working-class population.”448 However, Laurence contends that “the 
most serious challenge to integration in the next generation will still come in the forms of 
terrorism and nativism.”449 This suggests that as Islam has provided an important sense of 
identity for many estranged Muslim youths, the lack of legitimate Islamic religious 
authority in France may leave some vulnerable to potential radicalization. 
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IV. RADICALIZATION AND RIGHTS CLAIMS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
France has experienced a significant increase in violent and non-violent crime since 
the mid-1990s, particularly in the suburban banlieues.450 It has also experienced a “wave 
of Islamist terror” in 1995 and a series of gruesome terrorist attacks and attempted assaults 
beginning in the early 2000s.451 The majority of these terrorist acts were committed by 
French-born Muslims, a trend that “called into question some of the most basic 
assumptions French citizens have made about their country, most notably the ability and 
the willingness of newcomers to continue to assimilate into French culture.”452 In light of 
the observed increases in French Muslim religious adherence, Muslim-perpetrated violence 
has caused renewed concern in France about the integration of its Muslim population. 
This chapter first presents the radicalization and terrorism issues in France and 
considers how integration issues may have contributed to this phenomenon. It then explores 
whether multicultural policies could improve integration by analyzing the current status of 
France’s multicultural policies, the rights claims typically presented by French Muslims, 
and insights into “what makes Muslims feel French.”453 These claims are then located 
within the context of French society and elite discourse to evaluate the state’s reciprocal 
responsibility to facilitate integration. Finally, this discussion informs policy 
recommendations, based on the likely effectiveness of multicultural policies to both 
improve integration and potentially curb radicalization and terrorism among French 
Muslims.  
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B. RADICALIZATION AND TERRORISM  
In October 2005, France experienced a widespread outbreak of riots in the urban 
areas surrounding most major cities throughout the country.454 The riots were provoked 
by the deaths of two French Muslim boys in Clichy-sous-Bois, a suburban commune near 
Paris in one of France’s most impoverished departments, Seine-Saint-Denis.455 The teens, 
both of North African descent, were playing soccer when they were approached by a police 
patrol. Desperate to avoid confrontation and questioning, they ran and hid themselves 
inside an electrical power substation, where they were fatally electrocuted. Riots broke out 
in Clichy-sous-Bois, with violence quickly spreading to other departments in the 
surrounding Paris region and eventually to many other parts of the country, causing the 
French government to declare a state of emergency.456 The riots lasted almost three weeks 
and resulted in an estimated 200 million euros worth of material damage.457 Nearly 10,000 
vehicles, 233 public buildings, and 74 other buildings were burned by rioters in 
approximately 300 French cities.458 Between 10,000 and 15,000 individuals participated 
in riot activities, with an average age of sixteen.459  
One of the dominant media narratives initially framing the events presented the 
young rioters as Islamists.460 When the dust settled, however, it was widely acknowledged 
that the 2005 riots had neither a political or a religious agenda, despite the fact that most 
rioters indeed came from Muslim backgrounds.461 Upon investigation, French authorities 
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determined that most rioters had no history of violence and that Islamic groups had no 
direct connection to the events.462 Muslim clerics had even attempted to calm the rioters, 
to no avail, demonstrating Muslim institutions’ lack of influence in the situation.463  
The riots were also generally framed as demonstrating the failure of Republican 
integration, but Canet et al. argue that they actually indicate the very opposite–that the 
events should be understood as “manifest evidence that most of the frustrated young men 
feel entirely French and that they simply want to be accepted by the Nation.”464 In this 
sense, the riots were “a plea for access to French society.”465 The attention that the riots 
received nationally and worldwide highlighted “the reality of daily discrimination against 
young French citizens of Arab, African, and Turkish origin.”466 For example, an 
investigation throughout metropolitan France by Défenseur des droits, an independent 
administrative authority of the French government, revealed that young men perceived as 
black or Arabs were 20 times more likely than others to be searched by the police.467 
Moran explains that a long history of police brutality and mistreatment toward youth in the 
banlieues since the 1980s has contributed to “a profound sense of injustice” that has 
precipitated a distinct “us versus them” mentality.468 As a result, he continues, violence 
has gained legitimacy among suburban youth as not only a “necessary course of action” in 
the face of injustice but often as “the only means of making their voices heard.”469  
Violence escalated to another level in 2012, however, when a French Muslim man 
of Algerian descent killed three soldiers in Toulouse and three Jewish schoolchildren in 
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Montauban.470 Four additional incidents in 2013–2014 included police officer stabbings 
and ramming vehicles into crowds at Christmas markets.471 According to Neiberg, by this 
time, the Islamic State had “become at least a source of inspiration to a small minority 
inclined to violence.”472 The year 2015 witnessed some of France’s worst terrorist attacks. 
In January 2015, two French-born Muslim men of Algerian descent killed twelve and 
injured eleven at the site of a satirical newspaper, Charlie Hebdo.473 In connection with 
these perpetrators, another French-born Muslim man killed four and injured nine at a Paris 
supermarket, Hyper Cacher.474 The deadliest terrorist attack in France to date occurred in 
November 2015, when 130 people were killed and hundreds more injured after terrorists 
claiming allegiance to the Islamic state entered the Bataclan nightclub in Paris, opening 
gunfire into the crowd and detonating explosives.475 The leader of the attack was again a 
French citizen.476 2015 also included suicide bombers outside the Stade de France soccer 
stadium in Paris, the beheading of a man at a factory in Lyon, and a thwarted shooting 
onboard a train bound for Paris.477 
While these incidents appear numerous and some have resulted in high death tolls, 
it is important to note that, as Laurence and Vaïsse observe, “the phenomenon is marginal,” 
considering the size of France’s Muslim population.478 This supports their judgement that 
“there is no automatic link between an individual’s lack of socioeconomic integration and 
subsequent involvement in terrorism,” as many French Muslims with a shared experience 
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of poor integration do not resort to radicalization or terrorism.479  Instead, Laurence and 
Vaïsse contend that turning to Islamist terrorism involves a complex set of environmental 
and psychological factors that often include a personal identity crisis, developing a sense 
of political awareness, and an experience of religious awakening.480 Ultimately, however, 
they argue that “the personal encounter between ‘re-Islamized’ French youths and 
recruiters for terrorist networks is…the single most important step in their drift toward 
violent action.”481 As many French Muslim youth already experience the environmental 
and psychological factors enumerated, they could perhaps be more susceptible than others 
to the influence of a terrorist network should they come into contact with one. Although 
Laurence and Vaïsse affirm that many Muslim associations denounce violent jihad, Shore 
notes that among France’s more than 1,000 Muslim associations, “there are also 
fundamentalist and Islamist groups who profit from the freedoms of a democratic state.”482 
Moreover, as discussed in the previous chapter, many Muslim religious representatives are 
still foreign-born and may espouse more fundamentalist teachings of Islam. Interior 
Minister Sarkozy expelled at least 35 imams between 2003 and 2005 who “praised terrorist 
violence, called for assassinations, or otherwise expressed ‘hatred.’”483   
As noted in the literature review in Chapter I, however, a number of other 
radicalization models identify situational factors as important contributors to radicalization 
and potentially terrorism that are present in the French context. King and Taylor identified 
subjective group-relative deprivation and identity-related issues stemming from 
discrimination and lack of integration as common psychological factors in homegrown 
jihadi radicalization.484 Taylor and Horgan also argued that social, political, and 
organizational contexts affect an individual’s choice to engage in terrorism.485 Similarly, 
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Bartlett and Miller found that Muslim terrorists, non-violent Muslim radicals, and 
mainstream Muslims shared experiences of alienation from the state, anger towards 
Western foreign policy, discrimination, and identity conflicts.486 While these scholars and 
Pisoiu all found individual personality traits likely to be a decisive factor in radicalization, 
it is noteworthy that many of the other contributing factors these scholars identify relate to 
integration issues.487 As McHugh explains, “the link between the banlieue and radical 
Islam is often more correlative than causal, but certain strains of extremism resonate in the 
banlieue because they speak to the reality of exclusion.”488 While poor integration may 
not be the leading cause of radicalization and terrorism among French Muslims, it is likely 
still a contributing factor; and this warrants considering how to improve their 
circumstances.  
C. MULTICULTURAL POLICIES AND RIGHTS CLAIMS 
As Chapters II and III have already presented an account of French Muslims’ 
experience of the traditional French Republican approach to integration, this chapter 
considers whether a multicultural approach could improve the integration of Muslims in 
France. Koopmans employs two frameworks to assess multicultural policies, which 
provide a useful starting point for considering the policies in place in France. The 
Multiculturalism Policy Index (MPI) assesses countries’ multicultural policies by 
assigning a score of 0; 0.5; or 1 corresponding to their degree of implementation within 
eight categories: 
1. Constitutional, legislative, or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism. 
2. The adoption of multiculturalism in school curriculums. 
3. The inclusion of ethnic representation/sensitivity in the mandating of public 
media or media licensing. 
4. Exemptions from dress codes, Sunday-closing legislation, etc. 
5. Allowing dual citizenship. 
6. The funding of ethnic group organizations to support cultural activities. 
7. The funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction. 
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8. Affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups.489 
In 2010, France earned a positive score in only categories five and six, as French 
law has allowed dual citizenship since World War I and due to the Law on Association, 
which was extended to immigrants and the foreign-born in 1981.490 The Indicators of 
Citizenship Rights for Immigrants (ICRI) assigns a score of -1;-0.5; 0; 0.5; or 1 to 23 
indicators of differential cultural rights within five categories: 
1. The absence of cultural assimilation requirements for access to rights... 
2. Accommodation of (Islamic) religious practices outside of public 
institutions… 
3. Cultural rights and provisions in public institutions… 
4. Political representation rights… 
5. Affirmative action policies…491 
On a scale of -1 to 1, France scored -0.28 on the ICRI in 2008.492 While France’s 
score in both indexes has, in fact, increased as the studies have been repeated since the 
1980s, its persistent low scores in both models illustrate a policy framework in France that 
is not typically supportive of multiculturalism.  
In order to consider whether multicultural policies could improve integration 
challenges for French Muslims, it is important to examine the claims that French Muslims 
tend to make on the state. Koopmans and Statham define a claim-making act as “a 
purposeful communicative action in the public sphere” consisting of “public speech acts 
that articulate political demands, calls to action, proposals, or criticisms, which, actually or 
potentially, affect the interests or integrity of the claimants or other collective actors.”493 
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To distinguish relevant cases, Statham asserts that claims for group rights are characterized 
by two criteria: “if granted, the group right goes beyond the set of common civil and 
political rights of individual citizenship” and, “if realized, the group right constitutes the 
recognition and accommodation by the state of the distinctive identity and need of the 
minority group.”494 These differential group rights are the essence of multicultural 
policies. 
Carol and Koopmans evaluate “claims made by Islamic groups for religious rights 
in the public domain.”495 They specify that religious rights claims are those that “contest 
entitlements regarding the performance…or non-performance…of certain actions for 
religious reasons, or they are about entitlements that require others to perform…or refrain 
from performing…certain actions for religious reasons.”496 Table 2 presents data collected 
on religious rights claims made by Muslims in six European countries from 1999 to 2008.  
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Table 2. Issues of religious rights claims.497 
 
 
In France, the majority of contested religious rights claims focused on the wearing 
of headscarves and the construction of mosques. This supports Fetzer’s and Soper’s 
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assertion that “Muslims have not been able to put on the policy agenda such things as 
support for separate Islamic schools or state aid for Muslim social service 
organizations…instead, Muslims in France find themselves contesting rearguard actions 
on highly symbolic, though still very significant, issues such as the right of girls to wear 
the hijab in state-run schools.”498 Moreover, Carol and Koopmans observe that in France, 
the debate surrounding Muslim religious rights mainly concerns rights of low 
“obtrusiveness,” which they define as “the degree to which rights claims challenge existing 
institutions and the dominant culture of the host society.”499 
While religious claims are an important element of the multiculturalism debate, 
they are not always entirely representative of French Muslims’ grievances. As Fredette 
asserts, “we should  not assume that all Muslim political claims are religious ones or even 
religiously motivated.”500 In 2014, Maxwell and Bleich analyzed whether French 
Muslims’ tendency toward national identification was “more strongly related to religiosity 
or other factors such as socio-economic status, social networks, and immigrant integration” 
to determine “What makes Muslims feel French?”501 From this study they found that, in 
fact, “religiosity is not the dominant force shaping Muslims’ attitudes.”502 This is 
significant, as Muslims’ issues tend to be framed in religious terms when their concerns 
may in fact stem from other sources. In general, higher levels of religiosity correlated with 
lower levels of national identification, but this trend was also identified among 
Christians.503 Overall, only 75% of Muslims answered positively to the statement “I feel 
French,” which was considerably lower than the positive response rates of both immigrant-
origin and native-origin non-Muslims.504 Furthermore, they found that having segregated 
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social networks was negatively correlated with positive French identification whereas 
better socio-economic status and “being more integrated on immigration-related measures” 
were positively correlated with French identification.505 Consequently, they conclude that 
“factors associated with immigrant integration have the most profound relationship with 
Muslim identification.”506  
Similarly, the Open Society Institute conducted a study examining the concerns of 
Muslim communities in eleven major EU cities including Paris and Marseille.507 Its report 
indicated that “increased levels of education correlate with a greater sense of cultural 
identification with the state,” as represented in Table 3.508 Findings also indicated that 
“employment, particularly full-time employment, is a key factor for whether or not a person 
culturally identifies himself or herself as a national of the country, and whether he or she 
feels others see them in the same way.”509 As Laurence and Vaïsse note, a significant “gap 
[persists] between Muslims and the general population in level of education.”510 This 
factor, combined with the high levels of unemployment among Muslims in the banlieues, 
would certainly contribute to decreased identification with the French state.  
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Table 3. Do you see yourself as [Belgian, British, French, Danish, Dutch, 




Finally, the report also revealed that “half of Muslims who identified culturally with 
their country…did not feel that others viewed them in the same way.”512 This highlights 
an important element of integration that may not be resolved by state policies.  
D. SOCIETAL ATTITUDES 
As discussed in Chapter II, the French Republican model seeks to minimize 
differences among citizens and expects immigrants and minorities to proactively become 
part of a pseudo-homogenous national body. Gilles Kepel articulates several key 
“illusions,” cited in Neiberg, that underpin this historical expectation. The first was that 
“Muslim immigrants would see themselves as more Western and less Muslim over 
time.”513 In light of issues such as French Muslims’ often segregated communities, this 
has not necessarily been vindicated in the eyes of French society. However, Castaneda 
observes that “chain migration, social networks, homophily, cheap housing, and exclusion 
by others often combine to concentrate newcomers into ethnic enclaves, yet this does not 
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signify that these newcomers lack a desire to assimilate structurally.”514 In fact, Laurence 
and Vaïsse emphasize that “in poll after poll…self-declared Muslims and, more generally, 
French of African and foreign origin continue to declare their profound desire to integrate, 
their attachment to France, and their generally optimistic outlook.”515 This leads to another 
“illusion” of the Republican model, that “the majority of French society would be willing 
to accept Muslim immigrants even if they did fully assimilate.”516   
Muslims in France are regularly subjected to discrimination and sometimes hate 
crimes.517 Because “Muslim religious identity often coincides with non-European 
ethnicity or ‘race,’” it can be difficult to determine whether discrimination is driven by 
anti-Muslim sentiments, racism, or xenophobia towards those perceived as foreigners.518 
Discrimination is often observed in education, employment, and housing, but it is also 
experienced in many French Muslims’ everyday lives.519 For instance, Laurence and 
Vaïsse note occasions when “young people of foreign origin are denied access to bars or 
nightclubs, which can be a painful experience that has a profound influence on their 
attitudes toward French society.”520 Discrimination has significant implications for 
integration because “for Muslims, the persistence of discrimination and prejudice affects 
their sense of national belonging.”521 
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Discrimination can also be associated with Islamophobia, which is characterized 
by “multiple forms of anti-Muslim feelings, behavior, and policies.”522 Islamophobia and 
anti-Muslim hate crimes have also increased throughout Western Europe, particularly since 
the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.523 This behavior has included instances of 
physical and verbal assault and vandalizing mosques and other Muslim-owned 
property.524  
Islamophobia is often fueled by stereotypes and persistent negative representations 
of French Muslims within the media and elite discourse. At times, some French Muslims 
feel they have been portrayed in the media as “an amalgam of terrorist, Islamist, Muslim, 
North African, Arab and immigrant” or “Islamalgalme.”525 Fredette explains that the 
perspectives informing French politics and debate are often generated by a highly 
centralized “elite triad of discourse shapers,” consisting of politicians, prominent 
intellectuals, and the media.526 Together, these groups form a unique “politico-media” 
class in France that contributes to an insular perspective on Muslim affairs that is prevalent 
in media discourse.527 Since the 1980s, the predominant narrative perpetuated by this 
group is that of “failed integration” on the part of French Muslims.528 In this way, French 
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Muslims are typically depicted as a homogenous group that is harshly criticized for not 
making greater efforts to adopt French norms.529 
An important element of the failed integration narrative stems from the uniquely 
French understanding of citizenship. Rooted in traditional Republican values, there is a 
strong normative understanding of what makes a “good French citizen” who earns the 
rights afforded by the state.530 Within this narrative, French Muslims are often framed as 
“undeserving citizens, which opens them up to social, political, and…legal 
marginalization.”531 Fredette found this attack on their citizenship to be the primary 
grievance expressed by most French Muslims.532 As a result, she argues that 
many of the claims Muslims make are not rights claims per se. They are 
more typically demands for neutrality that would keep talk of religion out 
of politics altogether or demands for recognition that seek to compensate 
for the weak protection provided by the empty abstraction of formal 
rights…French Muslims are not demanding recognition for the purpose of 
obtaining rights; rather, they are demanding recognition to obtain the social 
equality they feel they deserve given their self-perception as rights-bearing 
French citizens.533  
In short, these findings demonstrate that, on the whole, French Muslims tend to be 
more concerned with the full realization of their equal rights as individual citizens opposed 
to pursuing differential group rights that are prescribed by multiculturalism.  
E. POLICY ANALYSIS 
The previous sections have shown that integration is not only a salient issue for 
non-Muslims in France but it is also a primary concern for French Muslims. Within 
France’s current Republican model, many forms of inequality, exclusion, and 
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discrimination towards Muslims still persist and impede their full integration into society. 
Haddad and Balz contend that “it is unlikely that societal conditions will improve for third- 
and fourth-generation immigrants without a radical departure from current and historical 
French immigration and assimilation policies.”534 For this reason, this section considers 
the advantages and disadvantages of multiculturalism as an alternative to republican 
integration.  
Multicultural policies could have some positive effects on the integration of French 
Muslims in the area of religious rights and accommodation. By allowing state support for 
some religious affairs, officially conducted multiculturalism could prevent Islam from 
remaining foreign-influenced. As Laurence observes, “the baton of organizational 
leadership has not yet been passed to the native-born generations,” and this hinders the 
development of an organic French Islam that allows the continued influence of potentially 
more fundamentalist forms of the religion.535 State support for accommodations such as 
mosques and religiously-affiliated Muslim public schools would allow French Muslims to 
be less reliant on foreign sponsorship and could foster more autonomy in their religious 
teachings and administration.  
Multicultural policies for religious accommodations could also help Muslims to 
feel less targeted by the state and society due to their religious identity. It is important to 
note that it is only in the French context of strict laïque secularism that many religious 
rights are even considered differential rights in France. As a result, many French Muslims 
perceive laïcité as “a direct attack on their religious faith and on their efforts to transmit 
their religious beliefs to the next generation.”536 For example, before the law banning the 
wearing of religious symbols in schools was promulgated, Catholic students were allowed 
to wear crosses and Jewish students were allowed to wear yarmulkes.537 While the law 
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applied to individuals of all faiths upon implementation, it was developed in response to 
the hijab, and Shore notes that “this differential treatment was never lost on France’s 
Muslims.”538  
This trend of bias against Muslims can be observed with respect to other elements 
of religious accommodation. Statham analyzed the accommodation of Muslim group rights 
versus Christian religious rights and identified significant gaps between non-Muslim 
majority and Muslim opinions.539 He found that Muslims were favorable toward state 
support for both their own faith and the majority religion,  whereas majority populations 
expressed significantly more support for Christian rights than for Muslim rights.540 
Likewise, Carol and Koopmans found that nearly half of all Muslim claims for religious 
group rights in France were in fact for parity with the rights of other faiths as opposed to 
special religious group rights exclusive to Muslims.541 In the words of Fetzer and Soper, 
“in many ways, French Muslims seem to be trying simply to obtain a modicum of religious 
free exercise rather than to create a flourishing spiritual and cultural life.”542 Since Open 
Society Institute research indicates that “religious discrimination against Muslims remains 
a critical barrier to full and equal participation in society,” it is crucial that Muslims not 
feel targeted for their religious identity.543 
Despite the importance of the religious element of integration, Maxwell and Bleich 
maintain that “focusing on religiosity is not the best way to analyze [French] Muslims’ 
attitudes or identities.”544 Additionally, as discussed in Chapter I, multicultural policies 
have some important limitations or weaknesses when it comes to addressing religious 
rights. As a result, adopting a multicultural approach could present a number of challenges 
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in the French context. First, it may be very difficult to determine a clear or widely 
acceptable way to define the specific group or groups that would benefit from the policies. 
Categorizing Muslims as a religious or ethnic group, particularly for the purposes of state 
support, is not permitted in France and would likely be quite controversial if it were. 
Defining groups by other attributes such as socio-economic status, however, as France has 
tried with some targeted urban housing and education policies, would provide an 
incomplete picture and would likely be ineffective in addressing some of the overlapping 
issues that French Muslims experience.  
Fredette speaks to the “intersectionality” of French Muslims’ many other 
characteristics— including gender, ethnicity, class, and immigration history—that 
contribute to their challenges and that would thus be difficult to address with multicultural 
policies that target just one element.545  This leads to another challenge to developing and 
pursuing an effective multiculturalism policy in France. As highlighted in Chapter III, the 
Muslim community in France is very diverse. French Muslims vary widely in ethnicity, 
immigration timeframes, French language acquisition, geographic distributions, types of 
employment, and religious denomination. Fetzer and Soper quote Shacher and argue that 
“a negative consequence of state policies that accommodate group rights–including 
religious rights and practices–is that they can unwittingly ‘leave members of minority 
groups vulnerable to severe injustice within the group and may…reinforce some of the 
most hierarchical elements of a culture.’”546 As demonstrated during the headscarf affair, 
not all Muslims seek the same group rights. This factor would complicate the development 
and  implementation of an effective multicultural policy framework for all French Muslims. 
Finally, a number of scholars have noted the unbounded nature of multiculturalism 
as a fundamental weakness of the policy. As discussed in Chapter I, multiculturalism does 
not define what claims go beyond reasonable expectations for group rights accommodation 
within any particular society. In other words, accommodating some group rights may lead 
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to endless requests for additional claims.547 This ‘slippery slope’ concern has been 
substantiated. As Carol and Koopmans have observed, in several European countries 
“settlements reached over basic rights such as mosque construction or headscarves do not 
lead to demobilization of the actors involved in them, but shift the focus of the debate to 
new issues of controversy.”548 Moreover, they found that the obtrusiveness of rights claims 
tended to increase as basic rights claims were granted.549 Likewise, Koopmans found that 
“in countries such as the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, which have granted 
Muslims parity rights and made basic accommodations…the debate has not ended, and 
demarcation conflicts continue to rage over claims by orthodox minorities within 
Islam.”550 Furthermore, Statham asserts that “significantly extending Muslim rights does 
not seem to bring majorities and Muslims to a consensus.”551 While the French Republican 
model and strict laïque secularism have produced a fairly restrictive environment for rights 
claims, it is not guaranteed or even likely that walking these policies back with a more 
multicultural approach would result in an equilibrium and resolve all of French Muslims’ 
integration problems.  
Due to complex state arrangements, it would also be difficult to determine the 
appropriate level of government to introduce multicultural policies in France. Laurence and 
Vaïsse contend that “since policy toward religious communities is made at the national 
level, the nation-state framework is the right place to look for developments.”552 However, 
as demonstrated with regard to previous issues of mosque construction or the wearing of 
headscarves in schools, some decisions about whether or not to accommodate French 
Muslims’ claims have been delegated to lower levels of government or administration, 
causing inconsistencies and often resulting in poor outcomes for Muslims’ rights claims. 
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This would suggest that multicultural policies would be most effective if adopted at the 
national level. By contrast, however, Bleich notes that, due to the highly unitary and 
centralized nature of the French government, “it is thus much more difficult for 
nongovernmental actors to insert multicultural policies into the national system.”553 
Consequently, he argues that “in a country where less than five percent of the population 
are ethnic minority citizens, it is less clear that multiculturalism is an appropriate policy 
for the whole nation than it is for localities with higher proportions of ethnic minority 
residents.”554 This suggests that multicultural policies would be more appropriate and 
perhaps more effective when applied in particular contexts.  
Ultimately, as discussed in Chapter II, the differential group rights prescribed by 
multiculturalism are still fundamentally at odds with the French Republican state model. 
As Bleich explains, “[leading French authors-and even policy entrepreneurs] argue that any 
‘right to difference’ would lead to a ‘difference of rights,’ a situation wholly unacceptable 
in a state which attempts to maintain a relationship with individual citizens rather than with 
corporate identity groups.”555 With this, a comprehensive policy shift on a national scale 
has the potential to do more harm than good. To illustrate, Fetzer and Soper assert that 
“defenders of laïcité argue that it is neither easy nor prudent to destroy overnight a political 
institution that took centuries to create and that has served France well throughout the 
years.”556 The traditional Republican model and values are so deeply ingrained in French 
society that adopting a comprehensive multicultural policy framework specifically for 
French Muslims could cause great disruption and resentment. This could be 
counterproductive to improving conditions for French Muslims and advancing their 
integration.  
Most importantly, however, multicultural policies would not effectively address the 
core of many French Muslims’ grievances. Whereas multicultural policies are designed to 
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impart and defend differential group rights, Bowen contends that obtaining “social and 
economic equality” has been the primary concern for Muslims in France since the 1980s, 
after many Muslim immigrants had earned citizenship and when the first generation of 
French-born Muslims was emerging.557 Fredette confirms this in her interviews with 
numerous French Muslims,  
the discussion was about what they deserved given their equal rights. They 
all saw themselves as rights-bearing citizens already…In short, the claims 
of French Muslims were typically grounded in a sense of national belonging 
that is not sufficiently recognized by others. And this sense of national 
belonging among Muslims is often justified by referencing the rights they 
already have as citizens of France.558 
Numerous examples have shown that French Muslims, quite simply, just want to 
be accepted and seen by society as ‘truly’ French. While rights are an essential element of 
citizenship, “in the French context, we can clearly see where rights fail to address social 
inequality.”559 With this understanding, we can conclude that multiculturalism is not an 
appropriate policy framework to adequately address the concerns of French Muslims or to 
significantly improve their integration into society.  
F. CONCLUSION 
In light of the increase in violence and terrorist attacks committed by French 
Muslims throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s, this chapter first sought to analyze the 
potential link between integration issues and radicalization. While integration challenges 
are arguably not the root cause of radicalization or terrorism among French Muslims, they 
represent a common theme that is likely a contributing factor. By analyzing the rights 
claims typically presented by French Muslims and the factors that contribute to their sense 
of national belonging, it is evident that social acceptance and full access to equal rights are 
typically the primary concerns. This finding supports a conclusion that a multicultural 
policy framework of differential group rights will not effectively address these issues in 
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order to ultimately improve integration. French Muslims have repeatedly demonstrated 
their desire to be fully integrated into French society. However, as Fetzer and Soper note, 
“‘successful integration’ needs to be a two-way street.”560 The French government and 
society both have reciprocal roles to play in the integration of French Muslims, and neither 
has delivered. In this context, successful integration will depend on a significant shift in 
societal attitudes that is more willing to accept French Muslims as full French citizens 
versus a new rights regime.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
French observers tend to view events such as the 2005 urban riots and the series of 
terrorist attacks committed by French Muslims since the early 2000s as indications of the 
failed integration of its Muslim minorities. France has espoused a unique Republican 
approach to integration since the French Revolution, an approach which does not recognize 
individual differences or sub-groups in society. It also embraces the strict secular policy of 
laïcité, which restricts religious practice and expression to the private domain and bars state 
support for most religious activities. As French Muslims have indeed struggled to integrate 
in this environment, this thesis considered whether a multicultural approach could improve 
integration and thereby curb radicalization and the development of homegrown terrorists 
in France. 
World War I and the aftermath of World War II brought large waves of Muslims to 
France consisting mostly of single men from former French colonies in North and West 
Africa. During these time periods, many served in the French military or were recruited as 
a source of unskilled labor. Because these individuals were not expected to remain in 
France on a long-term basis, the French government did not pursue a deliberate policy to 
facilitate their integration into society. As a result, their initial experiences in France were 
largely shaped by changing immigration policies, which shifted from encouraging to 
discouraging immigration and naturalization in the early 1970s. The economic crisis that 
struck France in 1974 caused widespread unemployment and fueled resentment toward 
Muslim migrant workers. Instead of returning to their home countries, however, many 
Muslim men remained in France, earned citizenship and either started or brought their 
families. 
Throughout the twentieth century, the French government deliberately employed 
policies that hindered the geographic, socioeconomic, and religious integration of Muslims 
into society. It implemented housing policies that intentionally situated Muslim migrant 
workers in large housing complexes and projects on the outskirts of major cities, where 
they were physically and culturally isolated from mainstream French society and excluded 
from economic and employment opportunities. Over the years, many of these peripheral 
106 
ring cities have evolved into large suburban banlieues that are characterized by poor 
schools, high unemployment and crime rates, and a palpable sense of social exclusion.  
Before the French government became concerned with Muslims’ integration in the 
early 1980s, it had also largely disregarded their basic religious needs and instead allowed 
representatives and imams from Muslim immigrants’ sending countries to lead and manage 
the practice of Islam in France. These foreign representatives often encouraged Muslims 
in France to return to their home countries and thus did not promote their local integration. 
Muslims in France also struggled to find support for basic religious accommodations or for 
establishing religious infrastructure, including mosques, prayer spaces, and Muslim-
affiliated schools. As a newer religion in France, Islam did not benefit from any pre-
existing arrangements with the state as the Catholic Church did. Therefore, not only do 
many Muslims feel disproportionately disadvantaged by laïcité, but also issues such as the 
wearing of a hijab in public schools have led French Muslims to feel discriminated against 
and targeted by the policy.  
Since the early 2000s, second and third generation French Muslims have 
demonstrated increased religious adherence compared with that of older generations. This 
suggests that Islam may provide an important source of identity for many Muslim youths 
who have encountered barriers to integration and who feel rejected or alienated by French 
society. The early 2000s also marked a notable increase in violence and terrorist attacks 
committed by French Muslims. This study therefore sought to analyze a potential link 
between integration challenges and radicalization among French Muslims. In line with 
many prominent theories on radicalization and terrorism, this thesis concurs that while 
integration challenges are not the root cause of radicalization or terrorism among French 
Muslims, they represent a common theme within incidents and are thus likely contributing 
factors that can render individuals more inclined to radicalization in the presence of more 
decisive factors. With this inference, this study sought to determine whether multicultural 
policies could help resolve French Muslims’ integration challenges.  
As multicultural policies imply differential group rights, the thesis surveyed French 
Muslims’ religious rights claims, the majority of which focused on issues of low 
intrusiveness, including the wearing of headscarves and the constructions of mosques. 
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Religious concerns did not provide a complete picture of French Muslims’ grievances, 
however. These were strongly influenced by experiences of discrimination and negative 
elite discourse that regularly questions their standing as citizens. This suggests that societal 
attitudes may play a much stronger role in French Muslims’ integration experience than do 
the state’s Republican integration policies. Furthermore, French Muslims tend to be more 
concerned with the full realization of their individual equal rights  than with differential 
group rights.  
Consequently, this thesis concludes that multicultural policies could help to address 
issues related to French Muslims’ religious rights, as many are considered differential in 
the French laïque context. This could help reduce reliance on foreign sponsorship, promote 
the establishment of an organic French Islam, and reduce feelings of discrimination by the 
state, particularly as half of Muslim rights claims seek only parity rights with those of other 
faiths.  
This thesis does not, however, recommend adopting a comprehensive multicultural 
policy framework in France for a number of reasons. These include (a) national sensitivities 
regarding the defining of racial and ethnic sub-groups and (b) diversity among French 
Muslims that is reflected in their differing interests in various rights claims. Scholarly 
research has also shown that expanding group rights has not always yielded long-term 
resolutions regarding basic rights accommodations and sometimes this leads to additional 
claims that are increasingly more problematic for states to accommodate. Adopting a 
multicultural approach would be in great conflict with France’s traditional Republican state 
model, which could invite great social opposition and provoke resentment toward Muslims 
that would be counterproductive to any potential gains from improved integration. Above 
all, multicultural policies would not likely resolve French Muslims’ primary concerns 
regarding inequality and access to their equal rights as French citizens. Consequently, this 
thesis concludes that the most significant barrier to French Muslims’ full integration into 
society is, in fact, the national society’s largely negative and unreceptive attitudes toward 
French Muslims. These attitudes would not be resolved with the implementation of 
multicultural policies.  
108 
In conclusion, French Muslims’ exclusion from French society does not indicate 
that they do not desire to integrate. Decades of intransigence on the part of the French 
government and society regarding efforts to support the integration of Muslim immigrants 
from former French colonies has contributed to alienation and sometimes hostility on the 
part of second and third generation immigrants who are French by birth but who often feel 
ostracized by society. Moreover, the traditional French Republican model and the strict 
state-church policy of laïcité have hindered France’s ability to address the concerns of its 
Muslim population and to improve their integration. This thesis ultimately expresses 
doubts about multiculturalism as an appropriate policy framework to adopt in France. 
However, the potential link of integration failures with radicalization and terrorism 
presents a salient national security concern deserving of France’s attention and warranting 
consideration of alternative approaches to integration.  
Further study of this issue should include an exploration of the experiences of non-
Muslim immigrants from similar geographic areas as the Muslim immigrants considered 
in this study to compare and contrast differing perceptions of acceptance and integration in 
French society. This would contribute to a deeper understanding of the role of religion in 
the perceived discrimination experienced by second and third generation French Muslims. 
It could also consider whether multicultural policies might have been more effective in 
promoting the long-term integration of Muslims in France if they had been embraced 
during the first waves of immigration. Additionally, it could examine instances of targeted 
multicultural policies in other countries to determine whether such policies could prove 
beneficial to aspects of integration if applied below the national level in France or in select 
situations.  
Further research should also examine the potential benefits of expanding 
affirmative action programs for French Muslims from underprivileged or isolated areas. 
These programs could aid disadvantaged French Muslims by providing them opportunities 
for education to which they would not otherwise have access, given their socioeconomic 
circumstances. Given the positive correlation shown between national identification and 
higher levels of education, this could be a worthy investment toward promoting integration 
and participation in society. Affirmative action programs could also help to increase 
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contact across racial, socioeconomic, and religious boundaries to build familiarity and to 
further normalize the participation of Muslims in mainstream French society. An in-depth 
analysis of the few affirmative action programs that have been experimented with in French 
secondary schools and universities could help inform the best way to introduce and 
implement these programs in order to maximize their success in the Republican context. 
While Muslim representation in the French government is still quite low, additional 
research should also examine whether Muslim representation in local government has 
helped to enact policies favorable to Muslim integration. 
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